Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

120 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
attempted to increase the infantry’s effectiveness with machine guns, emphasized
individual initiative and leadership with small units, and stressed the importance of
terrain and local flanking movements to speed the advance. The French developed
countermeasures—counterpreparation, thinning the troops in the forward zone while
organizing the main line of defense in the rear, and readjustment of artillery fire. 77
When the United States entered the war, many of its leaders, including General
Pershing, believed that the war could be one of movement, relying mainly on
infantry rather than artillery. Yet they still had to learn that effective, coordinated
artillery support was a major factor in the success of an operation. Heavy casualties
were the price of open warfare. 78
When well-trained and experienced commanders applied artillery fire correctly,
the results were devastating. One example was the American attack in April 1918 at
Cantigny, which entailed elaborate planning. Brig. Gen. Charles P. Summerall, who
commanded the 1st Division’s artillery and who had been the senior artillery officer
on the Baker board, utilized the flexibility of his weapons to a degree heretofore
unrealized in the U.S. Army. The preparatory barrages were designed to isolate and
destroy German positions around Cantigny. A rolling barrage, with shells hitting 100
meters (109.4 yards) in front of the infantry, moving forward every two minutes,
was to precede the assault. The heavy guns and mortars converted Cantigny and
the enemy dugouts into a volcano of bursting shells, flame, and smoke. 79 The communications
network between the advancing troops and their supporting artillery
was such that the infantry could depend upon the artillery, when requested, to hit
accurately and eliminate resistance. In his report, General Pershing acknowledged
that the “artillery acquitted itself magnificently, the barrages being so well coordinated
and so dense that the enemy was overwhelmed and quickly submerged by
the rapid onslaught on the infantry.” 80
In contrast, inadequate artillery support to the 2d Division at Belleau Wood,
caused in part by the mistaken belief that infantry alone could break through against
a well-entrenched enemy, led to heavy casualties. Success came only when overwhelming
artillery support was provided to the attacking infantry. 81 Even when artillery
support was more than adequate at the beginning of an attack, the AEF found
it difficult to sustain. It was hard to move artillery and supplies forward, especially
when they were dependent upon horses for transportation. The time needed to prepare
thoroughly coordinated fire support plans seemed elusive, and communications
between the infantry and artillery were frequently impossible.
77 Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 258-61.
78 See Mark E. Grotelueschen, Doctrine Under Trial (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
2001).
79 United States Army in the World War, 14:20; Society of the First Division, A.E.F., History
of the First Division During the World War, 1917–1919 (Philadelphia, Pa.: John C. Winston Co.,
1922), pp. 77–84. In Summerall Papers, Ms Div, LC, see also Cantigny Opns Jnl, 1st FA Bde, AEF,
28–30 May 1918, and Opns no. 99, 1st FA Bde, Plan of Defense Doc. no. 3, 21 Jun 1918, box 2, folio
3; Resumé of Opns, 1st Div, Cantigny, box 14; and Arty Employment Plan, 1st FA Bde, in 1st Div,
AEF, GO 18, 20 May 1918, box 15.
80 Pershing, Final Report, p. 51.
81 Grotelueschen, Doctrine Under Trial, pp. 31–53, 72–73.