Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

mOdernizaTiOn effOrTs
295
weapons themselves had changed. With the exception of the 175-mm. gun, which
was in the process of being replaced by a newer model 8-inch howitzer and the
Lance missile, the corps artil lery weapons of the 1970s were essen tially the same
as those in the divisions. But compared to those of World War II that could range
most of the corps area because of the small frontages, these weapons could hardly
cover the area of a single divi sion. 26
Lessons from the Vietnam experience were also key. Artillerymen had an increased
interest in improved target acquisition procedures and devices, recommending that
these processes be decentralized. They acknowledged that the corps artillery in some
situations would need to control a target acquisition system capable of serving the entire
corps area but argued that such centrali zation in many other situations would inhibit
the responsiveness of fire support. They then championed a sizeable target acquisition
capability at the division artillery and direct-support battalion levels in order to acquire
and destroy targets in response to localized needs on the modern battlefield. 27
To give the division commander the full capability of handling the counterfire
mission, three changes were made: the target acquisition mission was removed from
the corps artillery and placed in a divisional target acquisition battery; the division
artillery staff was strengthened with a tactical opera tions center that integrated all
intelligence (S–2) and operational (S–3) functions and contained a target acquisition
capa bil ity; and the division artillery com mander was given control of the cannon
battalions that could shoot in his sector. To accom plish the last action, field artillery
doctrine was changed to give all corps artillery battalions a reinforcing role to
one of the divisions or to attach them to a specific division. Although the corps still
retained control of the allocation of their can non battalions as a means of managing
resources, the bat talions were earmarked for certain divisions and fell under their
control for position ing and firing. 28
Because of the deletion of the corps target acquisition battalion and the attachment
of the corps artillery battalions to divisions, the corps artillery staff was reduced
to a small section within the corps headquarters company and the headquarters and
headquarters batteries of the corps artillery organiza tions were inactivated. As a
result, the command-and-control headquarters of the corps artillery battalions—the
field artillery groups—needed new doctrine. The Army decided to redesignate the
field artillery groups as brigades. 29
26 Tng Cir 6–20–4, Sep 1975, copy in Historians files; “Counterfire, Part One,” Field Artillery
Journal, November-December 1975, pp. 14–21; Donald R. Keith, “Forward Observations,” July-
August 1977, pp. 3–4; “History and Development of Field Artillery Target Acquisition,” Counterfire
Dept Handout AT1009, December 1977, FA School files.
27 Tng Cir 6–20–4, Sep 1975, copy in Historians files; “Counterfire, Part One,” pp. 14–21; Keith,
“Forward Observations,” pp. 3-4; “History and Development of Field Artillery Target Acquisition,” December
1977, FA School files; ACTIV Final Rpt, October 1969, pp. 3-16 to 3-22, copy in MHI files.
28 Keith, “Forward Observations,” p. 4; Edward R. Coleman, “Field Artillery Brigade,” Field Artillery
Journal, May-June 1977, pp. 40–43, 51; Draft FM 6–20-2, copy in FA School files; Jean Reed, “Conceptual
Organizations and Doctrine for Field Artil lery,” n.d.[c. 1975], copy in FA School files.
29 A number of reasons have been given for renaming the field artillery group TOE as a field artillery
brigade TOE, but none is entirely satisfactory. After field artillery redesignated its groups as brigades,
most of the other branches did the same.