Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

wOrld war ii
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photographs), and poor reproduction facilities often limited the use of aerial reconnaissance
photographs in the Pacific. But when these problems did not exist, aerial
photography was even more valuable in the Pacific than elsewhere as suitable maps
were unlikely to be avail able. 55
Radar, which was still in its infancy, was tested in Europe from late 1944
through the end of the war. The results were limited partly because the sets, not
designed for the purpose of spotting field artillery tar gets, were extremely heavy
and partly because of wet weather. The XV Corps found them extremely useful,
and by Febru ary 1945, 9 percent of the corps artil lery missions were based upon
radar find ings. Most commanders felt that the possibilities of using radars would
be increased through the development of small portable sets. 56
The study of shell craters to deter mine the direction and range of enemy artillery
had fallen into disuse before the war. In December 1942 in Tunisia, Capt.
George Morgan of the 32d Field Artillery Battalion became interested in the subject
and compiled a personal refer ence manual. Later, while serving as the assis tant
counterbattery officer in II Corps, he combined the results of his research with
those of two British armies and subsequently produced a manual that influenced
the use of “shellreps” in the entire theater. These reports usually contained pertinent
information on impact areas as well as the time and direction of the shelling;
when possible, they also included the number of shells and any duds, the type
of target, and the amount of damage. They were extremely useful in confirming
loca tions made by sound, photographs, and other means. 57
Other means of locating targets were coordinated at corps level. Reports from
prisoner-of-war interrogation teams, spies, friendly civilians, and other sources were
compared with photographs and sound, radar, and shelling reports to give accurate
target locations. 58
The development of improved gunnery techniques and standardized training
for all field artillery units, including those of the Marine Corps, contributed to the
ability of field artillery to deliver effective massed fire support. The evolution of
centralized fire control was one of the most significant improvements in the branch.
The policies and procedures in fire direction developed at the Field Artillery School
55 USFET Study no. 64, pp. 10–13, and Study no. 66, pp. 9–11, copies in CMH files; MacDonald,
“Artillery Cubs in Mountain Operations,” pp. 614–16; Henri Bourneuf, “‘Grasshopper’ Survey—Part
II,” Field Artillery Journal, July 1944, pp. 452–53; John C. Guenther, “Artillery in the Bougainville
Campaign,” ibid., June 1945, pp. 330–34; P. A. del Valle, “Marine Field Artillery on Guadalcanal,” ibid.,
October 1943, pp. 722–23.
56 USFET Study no. 62, pp. 13–14, and Study no. 64, pp. 8–9, copies in CMH files; Edward S. Ott,
“Employment of Radar by XV Corps Artillery,” Field Artillery Journal, August 1946, pp. 462–67.
57 USFET Study no. 64, pp. 13–17, copy in CMH files; Arthur J. Peterson, “Shell reps,” Field Artillery
Journal, November 1944, p. 747; Lee O. Rostenberg, “Shell Crater Analysis for Location and Identification
of Enemy Artillery,” ibid., pp. 738–44.
58 USFET Study no. 64, pp. 17–18, copy in CMH files; Carl F. Maples, “Let PWs Help You Plan
Your Fires,” Field Artillery Journal, May 1945, pp. 264–67.