Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

290 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
with unas sisted projectiles. It could move cross-country at 9 miles (14.5 kilometers)
per hour and on roads at 34 miles (54.7 kilometers) per hour, with a cruising range of
450 miles (724 kilometers). It could fire a full range of modern ammuni tion, including
improved conventional muni tions and nuclear rounds. Served by a thirteen-man
crew, the howitzer’s sustained rate of fire was one round every two minutes. 14 The
175-mm. gun, destined for replacement by the new 8-inch howitzer, had been in service
since 1961 and was an out growth of the older 155-mm. gun (Long Tom). The
weapon fired a 147-pound projectile, and its maximum range was near 37 kilometers
(23 miles) but at considerable cost in tube wear. The barrel life of the 175-mm. gun
was equal to only around 1,200 full-charge firings. The tube was exceptionally long
(sixty calibers), and its sustained rate of fire was one round per minute. 15 But, the gun
was relatively inaccurate and could not generate the weight of fire deemed necessary
for effective counterfire missions. 16
According to some field artillerymen in the early 1970s, there had been no significant
advances in nonnuclear artillery since the development of massed fire techniques
in the early 1940s. Because the Soviets could build up a quantita tive superiority in
cannon artillery supporting their main efforts (estimates varied from 2:1 to 5:1), they
could afford to deliver counterbattery fire while simultaneously delivering close support
and other sup pressive fires. Cannon artillery had to remain in position to pro vide
continuous support, and the longer a battery remained in position firing, the better
target it became. Dis place ment neu tral ized artillery. Piecemeal displacement reduced
support to maneuver units, inhibiting the artil lery’s ability to provide both close support
and suppressive fires. Some artillerymen believed the answer to the problem was the
multiple rocket launch er. The ability to achieve surprise with heavy concentra tions
of fire in a matter of seconds was considered a major advantage of rocket systems.
The main argument against such weapons had existed since they first appeared in the
United States in the early 1800s: in comparison to cannon fire, rocket fire was less
effec tive and more expensive because of its limited accuracy. Although rockets did
have limitations in accuracy and took longer to reload, their proponents pointed out
that rockets could deliver a far greater volume of firepower in a much shorter time
than could cannon and that they did not have the weather limita tions of tactical air
support. While not envisioned for direct support, the multiple-launch rocket system
was thought to be an ideal weapon system for use against area targets when a high
volume of fire in a brief period of time was desired. 17
14 Ludvigsen, “1978 Weapons Directory,” p. 134; Truman R. Strobridge and Ronald H. Schriefer, “The
US Army’s Improved 203mm SP Howitzer,” International Defense Review, no. 3/1978, pp. 389–92.
15 Ludvigsen, “1978 Weapons Directory,” p. 136; “Journal Interviews . . . BG A. Bar-David,” pp.
15-17; Larry Carney, “Europe Artillery Upgrading Reported Near Completion,” Army Times, 26 May
80, p. 24.
16 Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, p. 67. Counterfire includes counterbattery fire, countermortar
fire, and attacks on target acquisition devices, communications, and logistic organizations.
17 Allan R. Stern, “Do We Need a Multiple Rocket Launcher?” Field Artillery Journal, July-August
1974, pp. 25–28; Kenneth D. McDonald, “GSRS,” ibid., September-October 1974, pp. 12–15; W. H.
Rees, Jr., “We Need an MRL,” ibid., November-December 1976, pp. 30–34; Donald R. Keith, “Forward
Observations,” ibid., March-April 1977, p. 3; Charles J. Buel and Gary R. Miller, “GSRS Status Report,”
ibid., March-April 1979, pp. 13–15.