Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

44 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
The civilian teamsters that had performed so unsatisfactorily in previous wars
continued to serve accordingly during the Mexican War. Col. Trueman Cross, assistant
quartermaster general with Taylor’s Army of Occupation, recommended
the use of enlisted drivers, and in the act of 3 March 1847, one principal enlisted
teamster was added to each regiment and two enlisted teamsters to each company.
These positions were deleted at the end of the war. 81
When assigned missions within its capabilities, the artillery performed magnificently
during the Mexican War, but its improper or inadequate use caused great
difficulties in some actions, such as at Monterey in the fall of 1846. Taylor, failing to
consider the fortified nature of Monterey, did not take any heavy artillery other than
one mortar. Although the light batteries gave outstand ing service, they contributed
little to the American victory. Adequate supporting artillery fire could have reduced
American losses considerably. In addition, the field batteries were ill equipped for
the street fighting that ensued. 82
At Buena Vista, on the other hand, artillery dominated the field as it had at
Palo Alto. The battle demonstrated the skillful use of artillery defending from a
strong position, a role for which the arm was particularly suited. As successful as
the action was, siege cannon would have been even more effective. Outnumbered
by 15,000 men, the American army, 5,000 strong, won the battle on 23 February
1847. In his report Brig. Gen. John E. Wool, Taylor’s second in command, commented
that “without our artillery we could not have maintained our position for
a single hour.” 83
General Scott, who led the southern campaigns and took the Mexican capital,
used artillery somewhat differently from General Taylor. In the south, the terrain—mountains,
lakes, and marshy ground—hindered the movement of artillery,
and most actions were against fortified positions rather than on open battlefields.
The light artillery pieces, deprived of their maneuverability and lacking sufficient
punch, were not very effective. Instead Scott planned to employ a substantial siege
train of heavy guns, howitzers, and mortars, centralized under his control, for fire
support, attaching one field battery to each division (with an actual strength of about
2,500 men). 84 Artillery dominated the critical siege at Vera Cruz; however, because a
large percentage of the siege train had not arrived, Scott was forced to rely on heavy
guns and crews supplied by the Navy. The artillery continued to play a prominent
role in subsequent engagements, coordinating its actions with those of the infantry
at Cerro Gordo, Chapultepec, and Mexico City to defeat the Mexican army. 85
81 Callan, comp., Military Laws, pp. 393–94; WD GO 9, 10 Mar 1847; WD GO 16, 15 Apr 1847;
WD GO 39, 20 Jul 1848; Ltr, T. Cross to QMG, 23 Nov 1845, in Messages of the President on the
Mexican War, pp. 646–48.
82 Smith, Mexico, 1:249–61, 497, 499–504; Ripley, Mexico, 1:200, 204–37.
83 Edward J. Nichols, Zach Taylor’s Little Army (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p.
231. For accounts of the battle of Buena Vista, see Smith, Mexico, 2:384–400; 555–63; Ripley,
Mexico, 1:396–427; K. Jack Bauer, The Mexican War, 1846–1848 (New York: Macmillan, 1974),
pp. 209–18.
84 Birkhimer, Historical Sketch, p. 79.
85 Smith, Mexico, 2:21–34, 337–42; Ripley, Mexico, 2:9–39.