Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

a Time Of grOwTh
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The creation of the Chief of Artillery, AEF, facilitated training in Europe. Maj.
Gen. Ernest Hinds, who had previously commanded I Corps artillery and First Army
Artillery, served in this capacity from 27 May 1918 through the end of the war. His
major duties were to supervise and inspect the training of artillery organizations
until they joined their units, to supervise and inspect most of the artillery schools,
and to provide advice and guidance on artillery matters for the AEF. 76
On the Battlefield
In the history of warfare, the balance between the power of the offense and
defense is constantly shifting, usually because of changes in weapons and equipment
with resulting changes in tactics. Such shifts are often unnoticed until they are
demonstrated in combat. Although noted in previous wars, the changing balance
from the offense to the defense was not fully recognized until World War I. As in
the Civil War, artillery in World War I could not succeed against strongly prepared
defensive positions unless the offense had a definite superiority in numbers over
a largely exhausted enemy. The tactical effect of the vastly increased firepower,
brought about by new automatic weapons, rapid-firing artillery, and modern transportation
means, gave a new superiority to the defense. Tactical mobility became
dependent on firepower, but neither side had sufficient artillery and ammunition to
achieve the advantage.
Early engagements demonstrated the necessity for distributing guns in great
depth along the defense and the need for greater quantities of medium and heavy
artillery. By 1917, it had become apparent that, given enough artillery and ammunition,
limited advances (under a mile) could be achieved. But the element
of surprise was sacrificed, with attacks being accompanied by heavy preparatory
bombardments that often lasted several days. Although these barrages were somewhat
effective as a demoralizing factor, they were not entirely satisfactory. When
a barrage was lifted, the defending infantrymen had time to man the trenches and
machine-gun emplacements and to engage the opposing infantry advancing without
cover. Most offensive actions failed even though massive barrages preceded them.
Also, ammunition expenditures proved a heavy strain. The opposing forces took
counter measures in the form of counterpreparation (the use of artillery to weaken
imminent attacks by neutralizing enemy artillery) and stationary barrages close to
the front to repel the attackers. New tactics, weapons, or strategies were needed to
break the stalemate.
Except for the first few months of the war, neither side was able to gain much
ground until the spring of 1918 when the Germans achieved some success on the
Western Front. Characteristics of the German tactics included an intense barrage
of artillery, lasting several hours, followed by a rolling barrage in front of
the infantry at a preset rate; the bypassing of enemy strongholds; infiltration by
small groups; and continuous forward movement of both infantry and artillery.
These tactics called for the greatest cooperation between artillery and infantry,
76 “Duties of the Chief, Artillery, A.E.F,” fldr 381, box 41, Entry 22, RG 120, NARA.