04.06.2013 Views

Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

238 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry <strong>Of</strong> field arTillery<br />

separate systems were complemen tary.<br />

The <strong>Army</strong> was to develop a groundlaunched<br />

missile with a shorter range<br />

of 70 kilometers (43.5 miles), and the<br />

Air Force was to cover deeper targets<br />

with an air-launched missile as well as<br />

direct aircraft strikes. 71<br />

Pershing II Versus Cruise Missiles<br />

The role of the Pershing missile<br />

changed in the 1970s. Because NATO<br />

no longer had a clear-cut nuclear superiority,<br />

the old “trip-wire” philosophy<br />

was not as appealing as it had been<br />

in the early 1960s. Henceforth, the<br />

Pershing units served mainly as a deterrent.<br />

The Warsaw Pact nations enjoyed<br />

both superiority in conventional<br />

forces and nuclear parity. The strat egy<br />

of the 1970s required that deterrence<br />

derive from a credible capacity to fight<br />

either a conventional or nuclear war.<br />

By January 1979, the third-genera tion<br />

Pershing II missile was in the engineering development stage. The major change<br />

in the weapon was its terminal guidance system, which resulted in accuracies so<br />

improved over the Pershing Ia that the use of very low nuclear yields, or even<br />

conventional warheads, for a “surgical” attack on targets became possible, with<br />

supposedly minimum collateral damage. An extended range of 1,000 nautical<br />

miles (1,852 kilometers) was also planned for the Pershing II. With the improved<br />

missile, there was the possibility that SACEUR could accomplish the command<br />

tactical mission with fewer missiles, thus releasing some of the Pershings for the<br />

use of regional commanders. Neverthe less, Congress voiced some opposition,<br />

fearing that commanders might be tempted to use lower-yield nuclear warheads<br />

and thereby cause events to escalate. 72<br />

Pershing II missile<br />

71 Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., “Jockeying With JTACMS,” <strong>Field</strong> Artillery Journal, January-February<br />

1986, pp. 26–27.<br />

72 Jolliff, “<strong>History</strong> of the Pershing,” 20 May 1974, pp. 157, 220–23, AMCOM files and copy in CMH<br />

files; FA School Fact Sheet, [1979], sub: Pershing Ia and II, prepared for author, Historians files, CMH;<br />

Moore, “Pershing,” pp. 27–28; Skemp, “Pershing Missile Update,” pp. 464–66; Henry T. Simmons,<br />

“Pershing II,” <strong>Army</strong>, August 1974, pp. 17–20; “Pershing Go-Ahead,” International Defense Review, no.<br />

3/1979): 315; Larry H. Hunt, “Pershing II,” <strong>Field</strong> Artillery Journal, May-June 1977, pp. 38–39; Lawrence<br />

J. Korb, “The Question of Deploying <strong>US</strong> Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” ibid., May-June 1981,<br />

pp. 30–34.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!