Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

276 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
The far-reaching mobility of most Army field artillery units allowed them
to be widely deployed and thinly dispersed, yet still operate effec tively. Just
after its arrival in South Vietnam, the 1st Cavalry Division moved north to
Pleiku Province and saw combat in the Ia Drang Valley, popularly known as
the battle of the Ia Drang. The fighting between October and November 1965
was noteworthy, validating two aspects of the airmobility concept—the use of
helicopters to move and supply cannon artillery, and the use of aerial rocket
artillery at night and in extremely close support of ground troops. A prolonged
pursuit of the enemy by a large unit operating continuously over difficult terrain
and relying primarily on aircraft in every aspect of the opera tion was a first.
The helicopters, primarily CH–47s, made it possible to position and supply the
artillery units, thus allowing the infantry to have almost con tinuous coverage
in support of their ground operations. 20 During the 35-day battle, the 1st Cavalry
Division Artillery fired 33,108 rounds of 105-mm. ammuni tion and 7,356
rockets (2.75-inch). The concept of displacing and supplying artillery by air
proved valid, and during the cam paign, the artillery made seventy-nine tactical
moves, of which sixty-seven were by air. 21
The aerial rocket artillery battalion was particularly responsive and effective in
augmenting ground artillery fire, especially when it was needed beyond the range of
the divi sion’s conventional artillery. Aerial rocket fire was also inval u able during
the most critical phase of the airmobile opera tion—just after the unit’s arrival in a
landing zone. The aerial rocket artillery battalion was best employed in a reinforcing
role, with one of its three batteries habitually attached to one of the division’s three
direct-support artillery battal ions. The main armament of the battalion consisted of
2.75-inch folding-fin rockets, mounted first on UH–1 and later on AH–1 helicopters.
Subsequently, some helicopters were equipped with SS–11 antitank wire-guided
missiles, which were extremely effective against both enemy tanks and such point
targets as bunkers and other fortifications. 22
While Army planners had designed the 1st Cavalry Division, and later the 101st
Airborne Division, to make maximum use of helicopters, the other maneuver units
that followed also employed them extensively to move their troops, weapons, and
supplies, getting them from the corps-level aviation groups. Thus almost all infantry
units in Vietnam operated as airmobile infantry, and their supporting artillery
served in an airmobile role alongside them. The airmobility concept allowed the
artillery to travel deep into roadless areas in support of the infantry; the firebases,
which were established, supplied, and evacuated by air, were the key for mobile
large-unit operations deep into enemy territory.
20 AAR, Pleiku Campaign, 1st Cav Div (Ambl), 4 Mar 1966, pp. 4–5, 12, 18, 21, 24, 28, 60, 78, 84,
87–88, 90, 102, 123, 127–128, copy in CMH files.
21 Ibid., pp. 4–5, copy in CMH files.
22 Picou, “Aerial Fire Support,” pp. 46–48, 53–54; William F. Brand, Jr., E. K. Johnson, and Morris
J. Brady, “Airmobility Firepower—Hallmark of the 1st Cavalry Division,” United States Army Aviation
Digest, March 1967, pp. 18–23; Hay, Tactical and Materiel Innovations, pp. 28, 33; Elizabeth C. Jolliff,
“History of the U.S. Army Missile Command, 1962–1977,” Historical Monograph Project no. DAR-
COM–84M, 20 July 1979, pp. 117, 122–24, 127–39, AMCOM files and copy in CMH files.