Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

142 THE ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF FIELD ARTILLERY
of typical divisions, corps, and armies, based in part upon those recommended by
the Superior Board but differing somewhat because of the growing belief that the
AEF division (approximately 28,000 men) was much too large and unwieldy. 35
General Pershing, one of the critics of the cumbersome AEF division, felt that
much of the Superior Board’s report was based too heavily upon the needs of positional
warfare in western Europe and not enough on a war of movement. Pershing
thought the only way a mobile division (whether in combat, training, or at rest)
could have its organic artillery with it at all times was to reduce that artillery. He
suggested a division of 16,875 men with a single field artillery regiment (2,300 men)
of 75-mm. guns rather than three regiments of 75-mm. guns and 155-mm. howit zers.
That regiment was to consist of three bat talions, with each battalion having three
batteries of four guns each and one ammunition battery. This would have reduced
the number of divi sional guns from seventy-two of the AEF division to thirty-six.
The division contemplated by the General Staff’s Organizational Section, on the
other hand, had an approximate strength of 24,000 and included one field artillery
brigade of two 75-mm. gun regiments (forty-eight guns). This plan conformed to
Pershing’s idea that the 155-mm. howitzer regiment be eliminated, but differed in
that it retained the field artillery brigade structure. 36
These and other points of disagreement seemed so important that the General
Staff’s War Plans Division appointed a special committee under Col. William
Lassiter to resolve the differences and to plan the organization of the Army in
relation to the National Defense Act of 1920. The Lassiter committee discussed
the merits of the large AEF division and the smaller one recommended by General
Pershing, taking into consideration the increased range and mobility of artillery and
the probability that conventional opponents in future wars would be organized in
great depth. Although the committee wanted a division that would ensure mobility,
sufficient firepower and power of penetration were also important. A division of
two infantry brigades and one artillery brigade was not as mobile as a division of
one infantry brigade and one artillery regiment, but its mobility could be improved
if auxiliary and smaller units were reduced, and it would have greater striking and
penetrating power. 37
Copies of the report were forwarded to the chiefs of arms and services with instructions
to prepare tables of organization. In the report, the recommended division
had an approximate strength of 19,000 and the field artillery brigade two 75-mm. gun
35 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, p. 86; Rpt of the Superior Board, AEF, on Organization and
Tactics, AGO 320 (6-21-20), box 1737, Entry 37c, RG 407, NARA. After receiving the rank of General of
the Army of the United States in September 1919, Pershing elected to continue wearing four stars.
36 Wrapper End, GHQ, AEF, to SecWar, 16 Jun 20, AGO 322 (4-19-20), and Rpt of the Superior
Board, AEF, on Organization and Tactics, pp. 32–62, AGO 320 (6-21-20), box 1737, Entry 37c, RG 407,
NARA; A[rthur] W. Lane, “Tables of Organization,” Infantry Journal, May 1921, pp. 486–503.
37 Lane, “Tables of Organization,” pp. 486–503; “Report of Special Committee Appointed by the
Director, War Plans Division to Define the General Plan of Organization to be Adopted for the Army
of the United States Provided for by the Act of June 4, 1920, Washington, D.C., July 8, 1920 (Lassiter
Committee Report),” reprinted in Army War College Course Materials 52–29, pp. 2–7, copy in MHI files
(hereinafter Rpt, Lassiter Cmte, 8 Jul 1920). For further information on the interwar period, see Wilson,
Maneuver and Firepower, chs. 4 and 5.