Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

218 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
missile technology. Because the Redstone had been developed with only a 200-mile
(321.8-kilometer) range, the need for a long-range missile had not yet been met.
After the Soviet Union succeeded in developing a 1,800-mile (2,896.2-kilometer)
missile in the spring of 1955, the Army accelerated development of a longer-range
weapon. To meet this objective, the research and development group at Redstone
Arsenal felt that the Redstone could be modified, and in the fall of 1955, Secretary
of Defense Charles E. Wilson author ized the Army to develop an intermediate-range
ballistic missile, subsequently called the Jupiter, based upon Redstone technology.
The Army and Navy were to undertake the project jointly, but the Navy was never
particu larly interested in a liquid-propelled mis sile because of the difficulties of
shipboard storage, handling, and launching. Instead the sea service sought approval
to develop a solid-propellant missile and became more removed from efforts to
adapt the Jupiter missile for shipboard use. Once Secretary Wilson approved the
development of the Polaris missile for the Navy on 8 December 1956, it withdrew
from the Jupiter program. 22
In the meantime, an Air Force proposal for the 1,500-nautical-mile
(2,778-kilometer) range missile Thor had been accepted and given top priority, with
the Douglas Aircraft Company as the primary contrac tor. Because the Air Force
and the Army were developing mis siles with essentially the same characteristics,
considerable con troversy arose as to their employment. The Army wanted a mobile
long-range missile to support theater forces and believed that the launching of such
a missile from a relatively rear area might prove quite effective and economical.
Its leaders regarded fixed missile sites as too vulnerable in a battle theater. With a
missile that had sufficient ground mobility to maneuver with a field army, the Army
thought it would be able to strike massive blows on ground targets focusing on
distant troop formations, communications centers, missile sites, atomic stockpiles,
and airfields. In contrast, the Air Force wanted missiles that would serve at fixed
sites to support its Strategic Air Command bases. The Air Force reasoned that with
missiles ready to fire against enemy airfields or missile sites, penetration of enemy
territory by manned bombers would be improved.
In his memorandum of 26 November 1956, Secretary Wilson limited the Army
to a 200-mile (321.8-kilometer) range in its tactical surface-to-surface missiles and
gave operational control of the Jupiter to the Air Force. Although the Air Force
believed that the employment of long-range missiles should be under its control,
the Army had the scientific ballistic missile experience and talent to develop them.
Wilson, therefore, allowed the Army to continue its development of the Jupiter but
directed that it was to be employed by the Air Force. 23
22 James M. Grimwood and Frances Strowd, “History of the Jupiter Missile System,” 27 Jul 62, pp.
3–13, 23–36, AMCOM files and copy in CMH files.
23 Memo, SecDef for Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, 26 Nov 1956, sub: Clarification
of Roles and Missions To Improve the Effectiveness of Operations of the Department of Defense, cited in
Grimwood and Strowd, “Jupiter Missile System,” app. 1, pp. 1–9, AMCOM files and copy in CMH files;
W. G. Wyman, “Impact of Missiles on Tactical Doctrine,” Army Information Digest, December 1956, pp.
114–24; Donnelly, Guided Missile Program, pp. 28–31, 67–69, 95–96, 114–18; James M. Gavin, War
and Peace in the Space Age (New York: Harper, 1958), pp. 9–10, 76–77, 145–46, 154, 160–61, 167–68.