Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

POsTwar reOrganizaTiOn
Table 22—Field Artillery Missions in the Korean War
Type of Fire Percent of Missions
Harassing and Interdicting 22
Observed Fires on Targets of Opportunity 21
Defensive Fires (including support of patrols) 20
Countermortar 10
Counterbattery 9
Registrations 6
Counterflak 5
Offensive Fires 4
Tests and Training 3
205
artillery weapons, which were not as critically short of ammunition, be used instead
of light and medium artillery. Nevertheless, in the event of an enemy attack, a gun
could fire whatever amount was necessary to repulse it. To ensure the amount necessary
would be available, basic loads (ammu nition actually carried with the troops)
remained unchanged. 33
Although the troops could not fire as much artillery as they might have desired,
the ammunition shortage affected the Army worldwide more severely than it did
the war in Korea as long as the demands of the war remained stable. Only by the
spring of 1953 was the Army supplying ammunition to the theaters in more adequate
amounts.
The field artillery learned few new lessons during the war, but the importance of
the arm was reconfirmed. Artil lery played an important role in keeping the enemy
confined to trenches and bunkers, and the large expenditures of ammunition made
it possible for the United Nations Command forces to compensate for being outnumbered
and, in the end, to keep their casualties low. Counterbat tery, interdictory,
and harassing fires pressured the Communist forces continuously. The ability of
the gunners to put down heavy fire quickly and accurately was an influential factor
throughout the war. The types of artillery fire support employed in Korea between
October 1951 and July 1953 are shown in Table 22.
Fire support coordination centers 34 operated at all corps and division fire direction
centers, and the principle was also applied at the infantry regimental and battalion
levels. Coordination of air and artillery operations was maintained, but the formal
screening of targets to determine the most suitable means of attack was rarely attempted.
The artillery effort was limited except during enemy attack, by ammuni tion
allotments, but the air effort compensated by main taining available airpower at peak
operating efficiency. The use of naval fire support was limited to the ROK I Corps
sector, with intermittent naval long-range heavy fire employed in X Corps. 35
33 Reader Rpt, [1954–55], p. 69, copy in CMH files.
34 A fire support coordination center is a single location in which communication facilities and
personnel needed to coordinate all forms of fire support are centralized.
35 Reader Rpt, [1954–55], pp. 7–8, copy in CMH files.