Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

vieTnam
275
At each maneuver command level above the company, an artillery fire-support
coordinator was responsible for coordinating all available firepower: field artillery,
armed helicopters, tactical air power, air defense weapons in a ground-support
role, and naval gunfire. At the company level, the company commander was the
fire-support coordinator, although the field artillery forward observer was available
for advice and assistance. The liaison officer from the direct-support field artillery
battalion was the fire-support coordinator at the maneuver battalion level, while at
higher levels the fire-support coordinator was the com mander of the artillery supporting
the force. Fire-support coor dination centers were established at division and
higher levels. The decentralized nature of the counterguerrilla tactical operations
and the need to avoid civilian casualties increased the necessity for extensive firesupport
coordina tion. 17
In addition to coordinating all available firepower, the fire-support coordinator
also had to control the airspace in his area of operations—a task made increasingly
difficult with the extensive use of helicopters. Artillery-warning control centers were
established, normally at the maneuver battalion and brigade levels, to advise the
numerous aircraft over the area of existing fires. All support means were required
to notify the warning centers before firing, and all aircraft entering the area were to
radio the center to receive the necessary firing information as well as a safe route to
travel. The air advisory agencies passed responsibility for all airspace above 5,000
feet to the Air Force. In such areas as Da Nang, Ton Son Nhut, and Bien Hoa, where
Air Force traffic was heavy, the Air Force controlled the space. 18
Because of the nature of the fighting, about half of all artillery missions were
fired very close to friendly positions or into areas surrounded by converging friendly
forces. Extreme care had to be exercised to avoid firing on those forces and to ensure
that civilians in the area would not be harmed. The fire-support coordinator normally
obtained clearance from the government dis trict in which the supported force was
operating, making arrange ments to open and maintain the necessary radio nets in
advance of the operation. He also maintained maps marked to show the specified
strike (or free-fire) zones, as well as no-fire zones, based upon rules jointly agreed
upon by the U.S. and South Viet namese high commands. No-fire zones were usually
those in the more heavily populated areas, although exceptions were made if a unit
had to defend itself from attack or if an enemy force was positively identified with
the area. Clearance requirements and multiple agency coordinations created serious
problems, chiefly the loss of surprise and responsiveness. To reduce the time lost,
area operations involving night firing on targets of opportunity and harassing and
interdiction missions in less populated areas were often cleared in advance. 19
17 Ibid., pp. 47–48; Frank D. Grossman, “Artillery in Vietnam,” Ordnance, November-December
1967, p. 270; ACTIV Final Rpt, October 1969, pp. 4-2 to 4-9, copy in MHI files.
18 ACTIV Final Rpt, October 1969, pp. 4-9 to 4-10, copy in MHI files; John H. Hay, Jr., Tactical
and Materiel Innovations (Washing ton, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974), p. 32; Ott, Field Artillery,
pp. 48–49, 179.
19 Ott, Field Artillery, p. 48; Hay, Tactical and Materiel Innovations, pp. 30–32; Grossman, “Artillery
in Vietnam,” p. 270; ACTIV Final Rpt, October 1969, pp. 4-28 to 4-31 and ann. I, copy in MHI files.