Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

270 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
of the III Marine Amphibious Force to provide support in the I Corps area. Because
of the enemy offensive and the need for counterbattery fire along the demilitarized
zone, the number of Army reinforce ments in the I Corps area rapidly increased. To
furnish addi tional control of the units and operations in that area, Westmoreland
created a provisional corps on 10 March and placed it initially under the III Marine
Amphibious Force. The new command subsequently became the XXIV Corps, and
in March 1970, it relieved the III Marine Amphibious Force of its responsibility and
assumed operational control of all activities in the I Corps area. 5
Adapting to the Environment
The Vietnam firefights and battles tested the ROAD divisional concepts in an
environment not envisioned by Army planners. In many divisions, modifications
were made in the organization of field artillery units. In some battalions, particularly
in the divisional 105-mm. howitzer battalions, a fourth firing battery was organized
in response to the continu ing clamor for additional fire support from ground commanders.
It was not uncommon in the divisional brigades to have a fourth maneuver
element resulting from the use of the divisional reconnaissance squadron as a separate
maneuver unit. Also, the large areas of operation assigned to a division or brigade
were often difficult to cover with the conventional artillery organi zation, and the
fourth firing battery alleviated the problem. The extra batteries made it possible for
maneuver elements to operate within range of a howitzer battery. 6
Commanders created the fourth firing battery in a variety of ways. In some
instances, the Army officially authorized the organ ization of the extra battery. For
example, based on orders, Battery D, 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, provided additional
support for the 173d Airborne Brigade’s maneuver battalions; and the 23d
Infantry Division reorganized each direct-support battalion with two five-gun and
two four-gun batteries, thereby retaining the authorized eighteen howitzers. In other
instances, the fourth firing battery was orga nized provisionally. For example, the 1st
Infantry Division took one or two 4.2-inch mortar platoons from the infantry battalions
and attached them as Batteries D and E to each divisional 105-mm. howitzer
bat talion, even though the mortar’s rela tively short range limited its effectiveness
in the direct-support role. Other battalions organized extra batteries from existing
personnel and equipment using similar methods. 7
The aerial rocket artillery battalion was supposed to provide general support
for the airmobile division. In Vietnam, however, each of the three batteries in that
5 Ltr, AGSD–C (8 Apr 66) OCMH, 8 Apr 1966, sub: Change in Status of Certain Units; USARPAC
GO 124, 13 Feb 1969; USARV GO 1053, 9 Mar 1968; USARPAC GO 397, 1968; and draft of congratulatory
message on unit standdown. Copies in HHB, XXIV Corps Arty, fldr, CMH files. See also Willard
Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966–1968 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army,
1975), pp. 68–71.
6 ACTIV Final Rpt, October 1969, p. 2-30 and ann. G, copy in MHI files; Ott, Field Artillery, pp.
169–70, 172–73.
7 ACTIV Final Rpt, October 1969, pp. 2-30 to 2-32, copy in MHI files; Ott, Field Artillery, pp.
169–70, 172–73.