Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

CHAPTER 3
The Civil War
At the end of the Mexican War, the Army returned to its peacetime strength
and its prewar duties of guarding the coast line and frontier. Although the years
between the Mexican and Civil Wars were largely uneventful for artillerymen, who
served chiefly as infantry at scattered posts and stations, new weapons devel oped
during that interim period had a dramatic effect on fighting in the Civil War. As in
previous wars, artillerists continued to use low-trajectory cannon and direct fire,
line-of-sight aiming techniques, but the infantry’s increasing use of rifles soon restricted
the older manner of employment, for the batteries could no longer be safely
positioned within the 500-yard range of enemy rifles. In addition, the widespread
use of hasty field fortifications further reduced the effects of artillery fire. By the
end of the Civil War, trenches had become a common form of defense, and mass
attacks proved costly. 1
The Civil War campaigns provided the American armies critical artillery experience
in large-scale warfare. The older manner of employing artillery in small
groups had been the result of small armies, restricted battlefield maneuverability,
and line-of-sight cannon fire. The rapid expansion of the Army led to a series of
reorganizations, and the employment of a field artillery battery in support of an
infantry brigade gave way to the use of division and corps artillery as well as the
use of reserve artillery in support of an army as a whole.
The Prewar Years
After the Mexican War, artillery companies were restricted to their prewar
strength of fifty-eight officers and enlisted men, although the number of regiments,
four, remained the same. In addition to the artillery units, the Regular Army in 1848
includ ed eight infantry regiments and one of mounted riflemen. 2 Ele ments of the 1st
1 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987),
discounts the widespread use of infantry rifles as precipitating the shift from offensive to defensive
tactics; however, contemporary documents show that soldiers on the battlefield believed the rifles indeed
made a difference. See Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die (1982; reprint,
University: University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 60, 117–25; U.S. War Department, The War of the
Rebellion, 1st ser., 53 vols., and 4th ser., 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1880–1901), 1/2:385, 394, 406–07, 1/19(pt.1):845, 956, and 1/36(pt.1):336, 539, 669; John Gibbon,
The Artillerist’s Manual (1860; reprint, New York: Benchmark Publishers, 1970), pp. 220–22.
2 Callan, comp., Military Laws, p. 399.