Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

mOdernizaTiOn effOrTs
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The new divisional target acquisition batteries were each organized with a processing
section, a survey platoon, two sound-and-flash platoons, and a radar platoon.
The processing section became the targeting element in the divisional artillery tactical
operations center and served as a focal point for all target acquisition coming into the
division artillery from all echelons. The two sound-and-flash platoons had a range
capability of 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) as opposed to the 10-kilometer (6.2-mile)
range of the old corps battery. The countermortar radars in the direct-support battalions
were reassigned to the target acquisition battery’s radar platoon, which was
equipped with five countermortar radars and one artillery-locating radar. The planners
of the target acquisition battery wanted eventually to include both a platoon of
remotely piloted vehicles and Army Security Agency assets for radio intercept and
jamming. The target acquisition battery became part of the divisional TOEs in all
divisions except the air assault division in 1976, and by the end of 1979 all Regular
Army and National Guard divisions had their authorized batteries. A TOE for the
air assault division target acquisition battery did not appear until 1978, when authorization
for the aviation battery was deleted and the existing battery in the division
was reorganized as a target acquisition unit. The new organization was similar to
other divi sional target acquisition batteries except that it had an aviation platoon,
an aviation maintenance platoon, and only one sound-and-flash platoon. 34
Tied in with the reorganization of counterfire doctrine was the adoption of a new
tactical fire direction system (TACFIRE), under development since 1967. Increases
in armament and mobility had contributed to a reduction in the time available to
modern defense forces to react to a threat effectively, resulting in a greater interest
in development automated defense systems. The United States had led the world
in computer technology and produced the most advanced fire-control systems. The
first field artillery digital automatic computer (FADAC) model had been delivered in
1959, and its successor TACFIRE had been scheduled for delivery in March 1972,
although numerous technical problems delayed operation of the system for several
more years. A complicated system requiring exten sive training, TACFIRE provided
computations for both technical and tactical fire direction. Using a message entry
device, the forward observer communicated directly with the computer at the fire
direction center, and the computer verified the message, entered all relevant data,
and decided which battery in the battalion should get the mission, automatically
requesting action from a higher headquarters if beyond the battalion’s capabilities.
One weak link in the system was the lack of a secure, reliable communications net.
VHF (very high frequency) FM radios were used but were limited to line-of-sight
opera tions, thus restraining their use in urban or hilly areas; their weight, size, and
power requirements also made them a burden for mobile forces.
Technological advances, especially the revolution in microprocessing, soon
made TACFIRE obsolescent. In time a smaller version, the LTACFIRE (L for light)
34 TOE 6–307H, 31 Aug 1976; TOE 6–797H8, 19 Dec 1978; TOE 6–100H, change 2, 1 Sep 1976;
TOE 6–200H, change 1, 1 Sep 1976; TOE 6–300H, change 2, 1 Sep 1976; TOE 6–700H, change 1, 1
Sep 1976. All copies in CMH files. Because they could perform a variety of missions other than adjusting
artillery fire, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were eventually authorized for military intelligence
organizations rather than target acquisition units.