Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

vieTnam
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arose. A field artillery forward observer accompanied each maneuver company,
and he moved with the company and called for and adjusted artillery fire. Although
the TOE called for a lieutenant, the observer in Vietnam was often a noncommissioned
officer or other enlisted man. Many harsh conditions confronted the forward
observer. The terrain varied from mountains surrounded by triple-canopy jungle to
flat marshlands, and monsoon rains and humid tropical heat characterized weather
conditions. These environmental conditions, coupled with an insurgent-type enemy,
made the job extremely difficult. The thick forests and jungles hindered the ability
of the observer to see the target, which necessitated the adjustment of artillery
by sound—an exceedingly difficult practice. Because infantry companies often
performed diverse missions simultane ously as separate squads and platoons, the forward
observer accompanying one maneuver element had to maintain accurate and
up-to-date informa tion on the locations of the other elements and attempt to provide
adequate support to the other elements by relaying calls for fire from maneuver
leaders to fire direction centers. Forward observers also had to learn techniques in
adjusting the fire of aerial rocket artillery, a relatively new weapons system. 27
Forward observers on the ground and aerial observers were the principal means
of adjusting fire on a target in Vietnam. As in World War II and Korea, each infantry
division artillery had ten aircraft—helicopters in Vietnam—plus observers
and crew; observers and helicopters were also authorized for nondivisional artillery
units, and additional air observers were used whenever possible, especially in
support of overland ground movements. The role of aerial observation was, in fact,
critical, declining only in the waning years of the conflict when the enemy began
using sophisticated air defense weapons. 28
Other means of acquiring targets in Vietnam were available. Five target acquisition
batteries served during the conflict, including the headquarters batteries
of two battalions. Both battalion headquarters batteries were assigned to the I and
II Field Forces, where each coordinated the target acquisition operations in the
respective corps areas. The remaining batteries operated along the demilitarized
zone under the III Marine Amphibious Force (and later under the XXIV Corps)
and under the Capital Military Assistance Command near Saigon between 1969
and 1970. Although one target acquisition battalion was authorized per corps in
its TOE, none served in Vietnam. In-country studies recommended, however, that
a target acquisition battalion, less its sound-ranging equipment and personnel, be
27 Ott, Field Artillery, pp. 130–31 (quoted words, p. 130); TOE 6–185G, 31 Aug 1966; TOE 6–215G,
30 Jun 1966; TOE 6–205G, 30 Jun 1966; TOE 6–405G, 31 Mar 1966; TOE 6–405E, 29 Jul 1966; ACTIV
Final Rpt, October 1969, pp. 4-33 to 4-42, copy in MHI files.
28 Ott, Field Artillery, pp. 96, 179, 228.
29 ACTIV Final Rpt, October 1969, pp. 3-16 to 3-18 and 7-12, copy in MHI files. See also DA Msg
910341, ACSFOR, 23 May 1969, sub: Activation/Reorganization of Units in RVN, in 4th Bn, 25th FA,
fldr; Ltr AGSD–C (M) (29 Jul 66) ACSFOR, 3 Aug 1966, sub: Activation of HHB, 8th Bn, 26th Arty
(STRAF no. 19, FY 67), in 8th Bn, 26th FA, fldr; Ltr AGSD–C (M) (16 Feb 68) ACSFOR, 21 Feb 1968,
sub: Change in Status of Units (USARPAC no. 16, FY 68) to CINCUSARPAC, in Bty F, 26th FA fldr; Ltr
AGSD–C(M)(10 Aug 66) ACSFOR, 22 Aug 1966, sub: Activation of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery,
8th Battalion, 25th Artillery (STRAF no. 313, FY 66), in Btry H, 25th FA, fldr. All in CMH files.