Educational Psychology—Limitations and Possibilities

Constructivism
CHAPTER 37
Constructivism and Educational
Psychology
CONSTRUCTIVIST METATHEORY
MONTSERRAT CASTELLÓ AND LUIS BOTELLA
As we discussed in previous works, essentially the prefix meta- indicates a reflexive loop. In
this sense, a metatheory should be a theory that deals with the nature of theories, that is, with
the nature of epistemic and paradigmatic assumptions implicit in theory construction. Such a
definition is closely related to the use of the term paradigm to refer to a set of basic beliefs.
Metatheories are superordinate to the content of any particular theory, and include at least two
basic sets of assumptions: (a) the nature of knowledge, and (b) epistemic values.
As for the nature of knowledge, constructivist metatheory assumes that knowledge is a human
construction, not the neutral discovery of an objective truth. Thus, it departs from the traditional
objectivist conception of knowledge as an internalized representation of an external and objective
reality.
Epistemic values are criteria employed to choose among competing explanations. Questions on
epistemic values rarely arise in objectivist metatheory, since knowledge is viewed as a representation
of reality and, consequently, explanations are chosen according to their truth value—that
is, their correspondence with the external reality they represent. The objectivist conception of
knowledge and truth are thus closely linked and imbued with science—with the reliance on facts
to justify a given knowledge claim.
Constructivism cannot rely on the original/copy correspondence metaphor, since it departs
from a representational conception of knowledge. Justification by means of the authority of truth
is then regarded as an illusion. This nonjustificationist position leaves constructivist metatheory
facing the task of articulating an alternative set of epistemic values, taking into account that values
are, by definition, subjective preferences.
Although constructivist epistemic values vary according to different constructivist theories, all
of them can be viewed as alternatives to the justificationist position. Two of the most pervasive
sets of epistemic values in constructivist metatheory, however, correspond to (a) the pragmatic
value of knowledge claims (i.e., their predictive efficiency, viability, and fertility) and (b) the
coherence of knowledge claims (i.e., their internal and external consistency and unifying power).