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Educational Psychology—Limitations and Possibilities

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268 The Praeger H<strong>and</strong>book of Education <strong>and</strong> Psychology<br />

iii. The validity of the units of analysis adopted according to the answer given to several previous questions.<br />

In this respect, the discussion focuses on the viability <strong>and</strong> validity of using units of analysis that can<br />

bring together both mind <strong>and</strong> culture.<br />

We will devote the next paragraphs in our paper to discuss the different answers that may<br />

be given to the above questions by grounding the constructivist option in which we position<br />

ourselves.<br />

Regarding the first question, it may be fruitful to focus the debate not so much on whether<br />

intrapsychic processes exist or not, but on the question of what can such processes add to<br />

our underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the learning process. For instance, if we adopt a broader approach to the<br />

concept of mind, the question could be, how does such a broadening affect our underst<strong>and</strong>ing of<br />

the processes taking place in the classroom?<br />

The answer, at least taking into account what we presently know, cannot be a simple one. As<br />

Salomon argues in his compilation on distributed cognition, we may consider different entities<br />

in different contexts. Thus, in certain educational contexts cognition is likely to be a collective<br />

process, depending above all on the organization of such cultural contexts. A good example is<br />

classrooms which are organized as learning communities, that is, classrooms in which learning<br />

benefits from the social interaction among equals. However, not all contexts are organized in this<br />

way <strong>and</strong>, in some cases, they function as individual contexts as well. Thus, contexts where we<br />

think with others <strong>and</strong> contexts where we think on our own with the help of other cultural artifacts<br />

can coexist.<br />

This point leads us to the second question suggested: the existence <strong>and</strong>/or functionality of the<br />

notion of individual mental representations. The connection between individual representations<br />

<strong>and</strong> social activities is difficult to ignore, but it is also obvious that it is not an isomorphic one,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that it is not always a smooth one. Salomon defines it as a “spiral of effects” that mutually<br />

influence each other.<br />

Moreover, research results from studies on conceptual <strong>and</strong> representational change consistently<br />

question the existence of schematic representations that are stable <strong>and</strong> relatively independent<br />

from their context. As a result, among other things, of the persistence of implicit theories, the<br />

coexistence of contradictory knowledge, <strong>and</strong> the nonactivation of certain schemata in certain<br />

contexts, a new representational model has been proposed from cognitive psychology which is<br />

more in line with the social approach to learning <strong>and</strong> cognition, <strong>and</strong> more congruent with a view<br />

of cognitive functioning characterized by flexibility <strong>and</strong> adaptation to context.<br />

Such a new model, as we have already pointed out in previous works, includes the existence<br />

of intermediate levels of representation between schemata <strong>and</strong> action—levels of a potentially<br />

explicit nature <strong>and</strong> highly context-dependent—called mental models (Liesa & Castelló, in press).<br />

We believe that this new representational model constitutes a potentially significant cornerstone<br />

for the construction of a new integrative paradigm in which individual representations as well as<br />

a cultural approach to teaching <strong>and</strong> learning processes can find room.<br />

Finally, regarding the third of the threads suggested above <strong>and</strong> following the previous line<br />

of thought, we believe that it is not only possible but also highly desirable to broaden the<br />

unit of analysis of educational psychology to the social <strong>and</strong> cultural, that is, to action, activity,<br />

interaction, or interactivity. This is particularly the case if we assume that educational situations<br />

must be studied in context <strong>and</strong> that teaching <strong>and</strong> learning processes in school settings are always<br />

socially <strong>and</strong> culturally situated.<br />

However, this does not solve the problem of the complexity of devising <strong>and</strong> conducting educational<br />

research studies in culturally situated contexts—quite the contrary. Even if an interactive<br />

unit of analysis facilitates the underst<strong>and</strong>ing of social action taking place in the classroom, it<br />

does not allow us to grasp the relationship between such an action <strong>and</strong> the different levels of

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