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Educational Psychology—Limitations and Possibilities

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332 The Praeger H<strong>and</strong>book of Education <strong>and</strong> Psychology<br />

Self-directed learning also rests on a modernistic, <strong>and</strong> problematic, conceptualization of the<br />

self. A self-directed learner is seen as one who makes free <strong>and</strong> uncoerced choices from amongst<br />

a smorgasbord of enticing possibilities. The choices such a learner makes are held to reflect his or<br />

her desire to realize the strivings, dreams, <strong>and</strong> aspirations that lie at the core of his or her identity.<br />

So self-directed learning clearly depends on there being a ‘self’ to do the learning. This conception<br />

of the learner as a differentiated <strong>and</strong> self-contained individual entity has traditionally been at the<br />

core of educational psychology. In recent years, however, a growing body of critically inclined<br />

psychological work has questioned this conception. Educators such as Kincheloe (1999a,b) argue<br />

that we should talk of subjects rather than selves, <strong>and</strong> that subjects are produced <strong>and</strong> continually<br />

reproduced by culture <strong>and</strong> society. Such a conception of the socially produced nature of the self<br />

is central both to critical theory <strong>and</strong> postmodernism. Once self-directed learning becomes viewed<br />

as a social phenomenon, a process that is enacted within networks rather than located in the<br />

individual cortex, then it ceases to be a series of individualistic, dislocated decisions of interest<br />

only to educational psychologists. Instead it traverses the domains of critical social psychology<br />

<strong>and</strong> political economy <strong>and</strong> becomes of concern to political activists.<br />

To critical educational psychologists the predominance of the concept of self-directed learning<br />

illustrates the tendency of humanistic educators to collapse all political questions into a narrowly<br />

reductionist technical rationality. From the perspective of a critical educational psychology, the<br />

early free spirit of self-direction has been turned (through the technology of learning contracts)<br />

into a masked form of repressive surveillance—one more example of the infinite flexibility<br />

of hegemony, of the workings of a coldly efficient form of repressive tolerance. What began<br />

as a cultural challenge, a counter hegemonic effort, has taken a technocratic, accommodative<br />

turn. It is certainly highly plausible to see the technology of self-directed learning—particularly<br />

the widespread acceptance <strong>and</strong> advocacy of learning contracts—as a highly developed form<br />

of surveillance. By interiorizing what Foucault (1980) calls the “normalizing gaze” (teacher<br />

developed norms concerning what’s acceptable) through their negotiations with faculty, learning<br />

contracts transfer the responsibility for overseeing learning from the teacher to the learner. This is<br />

usually spoken of as an emancipatory process of empowerment in which educators are displaying<br />

an admirable responsiveness to student needs <strong>and</strong> circumstances. But, using Foucault’s principle<br />

of reversal (seeing something as the exact opposite of what it really is) learning contracts can<br />

be reframed <strong>and</strong> understood as a sophisticated means by which the content <strong>and</strong> methodology of<br />

learning can be monitored without the teacher needing to be physically present.<br />

This chapter questions the view that self-directed learning can be studied, <strong>and</strong> facilitated, as if<br />

it were the product of a monological consciousness. It argues instead that such learning is always<br />

ideologically framed <strong>and</strong> never the innocent, unfettered expression of individual preference.<br />

Drawing on a critical theory perspective the chapter calls into question the foundational belief<br />

of some educational psychologists that people make free choices regarding their learning that<br />

reflect authentic desires felt deeply at the very core of their identity. Ideology critique—the<br />

core critical thinking process of critical theory—rejects self-directed learning’s ideal of learners<br />

making autonomous choices among multiple possibilities. Instead it alerts us to the way that a<br />

concept like self-direction that is seemingly replete with ideals of liberty <strong>and</strong> freedom can end<br />

up serving repressive interests. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how self-directed<br />

learning can be reclaimed as an inherently critical process. If in 2002 <strong>and</strong> 2003 there had been<br />

widespread self-directed learning projects focused on researching the accuracy of the arguments,<br />

justifications, <strong>and</strong> assumptions regarding the proposed unilateral invasion of Iraq it is unlikely that<br />

that there would have been so little public questioning of the Bush administration’s justifications<br />

for it. In this atmosphere of jingoistic self-justification it seemed as if self-directed learning’s best<br />

role was to act as some kind of force for political detoxification. If adults could be encouraged<br />

to discuss a range of different perspectives on the invasion it would be much harder for the

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