Reflections on the Human Condition - Api-fellowships.org

government long maintained an interpretation that only
a minimum standard of self defense is compatible with
the first paragraph of Article 9. (Watanabe: 1993, 43)
The means necessary to exercise that right to individual
self defense itself must be limited. Accordingly, the
government established hadome (breaks) designed to
curtail unwarranted expansion of SDF’s capability.
These hadome are: (1) 1% of GNP defense spending
cap; (2) three non-nuclear principles (ban on acquiring,
producing or possessing nuclear weapons); (3) ban
on overseas deployment; and (4) limits on offensive
weapons (SDF is not permitted to possess offensive
weapons and equipment, including those with power
projection potential such as aircraft carriers and escort
vessels, long range bombers, long-range missiles and
mid-air refueling capability). (Reinwick: 1995, 41)
These hadome became the de facto parameters of
subsequent SDF modernization programs.
However, the government selectively and inconsistently
observed these hadome. For instance, the defense
spending cap was breached in 1983 under Prime
Minister Nakasone, when Japan first embarked on its
first military modernization program. 1 In terms of
equipment, what constitutes “war potential” has also
been flexibly interpreted. In the 1980s, air refueling
capacity was thought to construe war potential but
is now part of the SDF’s purchases under the new
modernization plan. Japan has small carrier vessels, but
retrofitted to carry amphibious vehicles and helicopters
for emergency rescue and relief operations only. The
SDF has been on prior occasions dispatched overseas for
joint or multilateral military training exercises (e.g. with
US, and RIMPAC), for research expedition (e.g. the
deployment of the MSDF for a research expedition in
Antarctica), for post-conflict minesweeping operations.
(e.g. in the Persian Gulf in 1991)
While minimum force necessary for self defense as
defined is constitutionally permissible, collective selfdefense
is not. 2 It is argued that the material and
personnel requirement to meet responsibility for
collective self-defense exceeds this minimum limit.
While Japan can use force as an act of self-defense, it
can not commit to do the same to aid other countries
as part of a collective defense agreement. Corollary
to this, the US-Japan arrangement is not a collective
defense arrangement similar to NATO because Japan
is not obliged (as interpreted) to defend the US in the
event US is attacked by a third country. Similarly, a
collective security arrangement whereby member
countries commit to forcibly respond in a unified
fashion against an indeterminate aggressor is not
permitted under Article 9. Japan, therefore cannot
THE STATE, DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION
219
have SDF forces join a use of force operations similar to
the 1991 Gulf War alliance or any UN multinational
force-like arrangement.
Throughout the Cold War, the government assumed
that Japan’s defense could not be solely guaranteed by
its own wherewithal. Noting the superpower rivalry
between nuclear-possessing US and Soviet Union,
Japan’s defense was more firmly provided under the
US-Japan security arrangement. (Wooley: 2000, 44)
In the assumed threat scenario of large scale invasion
by the Soviet Union, the SDF is assumed to maintain
air superiority until reinforcement from the US
arrives. But the government also adopted a flexible
interpretation of what constitutes minimum standard
of defense, depending on the understanding of the
nature of the threat. 3 Beginning 1970s, this has come
to mean that the SDF must maintain air superiority at
least during the initial stages. In the 1980s, the standard
of defense was expanded to include defense of vital sea
lanes. In recent years, ballistic missile defense has also
been treated as standard.
The overarching state principle under Article 9 is (and
remains) that Japan cannot engage in an aggressive war
(use of force) nor can it be involved in another country’s
use of force. Operationally, this principle invokes the
limit of US-Japan bilateral relationship. Under Article
6 of the Japan-US security treaty, Japan is only obliged
to support US military activities that contribute to the
security of Japan, and the peace and security of the Far
East region. Until 1997, neither Japan nor the US
sought to substantiate how Japan could contribute to
US operations in the region. This was mainly because
the perception at that time leaned against the likelihood
of instability erupting in the region. Also, Japan cannot
be part of a UN-authorized use-of-force operations nor
could it contribute to a theoretical UN standing army
for that purpose. As Japan relied primarily on monetary
contributions (in terms of foreign aid or financial
support to peacekeeping operations) to international
security, this non-use of force principle is moot.
THE WAY IT WAS: CRAFTING POLICY ON
DEFENSE AND SECURITY BEFORE 1992
Security policy making in Japan prior to 1992 has
been characterized as a “two level game” in which the
government must simultaneously appease Americans
demanding for Japan to contribute more, and the
skeptical public and partisan left’s hostility towards
remilitarization. (Cowhey, 1995) Although the Liberal
Democratic Party’s (LDP) status as a one-party
majority was never seriously contested by the left parties
Ref lections on the Human Condition: Change, Conflict and Modernity
The Work of the 2004/2005 API Fellows