Reflections on the Human Condition - Api-fellowships.org

trol by Suharto. The approximately 40 to 60 percent
balance of power between the Islamic forces on the
one hand and the secular-nationalists on the other has
persisted into contemporary times. Both the 1999 and
the 2004 general elections have deviated little from this
equation, which appears to imply that the electorate,
while overwhelmingly subscribing to Islam as a faith,
most wants little to do with Islam as formal structures
of state, governance and law.
Are these not legitimate indicators that pluralism in
Indonesian Islam is not merely a concept but a received
way of life? Are not the voices calling for greater
formalization and consistent uniform practice a
persistent minority? What then are the implications of
such tendencies vis-à-vis the developments in Indonesian
Islam 4 within the context of today’s political
developments, taking into account both internal and
external/global influences that play into the shaping of
Islamic thought?
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKDROP
No doubt the secular nationalists included non-Muslim
natives, but their numbers merely held the balance
between the two main Muslim factions: santri 5 and
abangan. 6 The Muslims were themselves divided and
remain so until today resulting in a political Islam that
can be said to cover the whole political spectrum, from
moderate to reactionary extremists.
Two very large religio-social organizations dominate
Indonesian Islam’s landscape. On the one hand, the
urban-based Muhammadiyah, headquartered in Jogjakarta,
and on the other, the largely rural Nahdlatul Ulama,
popularly referred to as NU with its stronghold in East
Java. Between them they have the potential to mobilize
some 70 million members, which makes them a political
force to be reckoned with. Then there is Hizbut Tahrir
that doubles up as a political party, which aspires to a
modern day Caliphate, but not necessarily a modernist
version of Islam. They lament the passing of the four
Righteous Caliphs, Abu Bakar, Uthman, ‘Umar and
‘Ali; and, the Medina Charter. The proponents of an
Islamic state, meanwhile, take the form of the Majlis
Mujahiddin Indonesia (MMI) headed by Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir who stands accused by Washington as a master
international terrorist from Jemaah Islamiah (JI), an
underground movement whose existence is yet to be
proven by hard facts, which in turn makes accusations
of its affiliation to the international terrorist group led
by Osama ben Ladin, al-Qaeda, mere hearsay. 7 There is,
too, the now formally disbanded Laskar Jihad 8 accused
of much religious sectarianism and violence in such
ENGAGING MODERNITY: RELIGION, GENDER, AND ART 69
places as Ambon. Another group with proven violent
tendencies is the Front Pembela Islam (FPI). Accused
of thugery and criminal protectionism, 9 they are prone
to such actions as vandalizing bars that stay open during
the Muslim fasting month of Ramadhan. Like Laskar
Jihad, the FPI’s Islamic ideological credentials are
considered questionable by many quarters. Both these
groups are alleged to have links with the country’s security
forces and were instruments of state terror during the
Suharto era. As recently as August 2005, the FPI has
been reported to openly threaten members of the Jaringan
Islam Liberal (JIL) at their base in the Utan Kayu Community
complex, Jakarta. However, the allegations have been
officially denied. 10
JIL is another emerging influence in the Indonesian
Islamic political mosaic. Headed by Ulil Abshar Abdallah,
this faction is strongly supported by former NU head
and Indonesian president, Abdurrahman “Gus Dur”
Wahid. Making the most of the media, these modernist
Muslims air their progressive and sometimes radical
ideas through print and radio enabling a reasonably
wide dissemination making their prominent members
targets of abuse by conservative Muslims, including the
Majlis Ugama Indonesia (MUI) headed by Din
Shamsuddin, who now also heads the Muhammadiyah.
Set up as a reaction to the aggressive voice of Muslim
extremists, JIL’s mission is to portray the benign face of
Islam within their given definition of “liberal Islam”.
The name “liberal Islam” demonstrates the principles
that we embrace, that is, Islam which stresses personal
freedoms and freedoms from oppressive socio-political
structures. “Liberal” here has two meanings: freedom
to and freedom from. We believe that Islam is burdened
by adjectives because, in reality, Islam is differently
interpreted in line with the need of the interpreter.
We choose a specific interpretation, and as a result
one description of Islam, which is, “liberal.” To
bring about Liberal Islam, we formed Jaringan Liberal
Islam (JIL). 11
JIL is not a social organization. Rather, for purposes of its
vision and the widespread dissemination of its message,
which is “memunculkan Islam yang ke Indonesiaan” 12
it exists as a network.
“JIL itu semacam forum atau wadah, tempat untuk
menggodok, merumuskan pemikiran Islam. Artinya
ada semacam keinginan atau tujuan ingin
melanjutkan pembaharuan, reform pemikiran Islam
di Indonesia yang sudah dipelopori sebelumnya oleh
Cak Nur, Gus Dur (tokoh-tokoh) seperti itu….
Ref lections on the Human Condition: Change, Conflict and Modernity
The Work of the 2004/2005 API Fellows