Reflections on the Human Condition - Api-fellowships.org

226 SESSION IV
in somewhat cohesive.
Numerous newspaper polls of legislators also provide
insight into this shifting party stance on security matters.
In a Mainichi 2000 poll, DPJ lawmakers exhibited a
continuing split on the issue of constitutional revision.
While 27.7% supported an aggressive review of the
constitution, 18.8% explicitly said that even in a
review, Article 9 should be kept in tact. In the 2004
Tokyo Shimbun poll, the DPJ exhibits the same pattern
of stubborn resistance in amending Article 9. While
68% of DPJ lawmakers are for constitutional revision,
only about half of them favor amending Article 9. The
LDP meanwhile, according to the same poll, is moving
towards a more cohesive stance on revising Article 9.
Of the 96% of LDP members favoring constitutional
revision, 80% call for amending Article 9. This trend
is supported by the Yomiuri 2004 polls in which an
overwhelming majority (88%) of LDP lawmakers favor
amending Article 9, compared to 71% of New Komeito
and 70% of New Komeito who are opposed. The chasm
is as wide on the issue of right of collective self defense.
While 78% of LDP members argue that Japan can
exercise this right, 86% of New Komeito and 54% of
DPJ disagree. A similar gap was evident in the Kyodo
2004 poll. Eight (8) out 10 LDP lawmakers want Article
9 revised compared to 18% of New Komeito members.
Almost half of DPJ lawmakers (46.7%) favor revising
Article 9. Seventy six percent (76%) of LDP want to
write in a provision recognizing Japan’s collective right
of self-defense, while 84.6% of New Komeito members
are against it. However DPJ members are clearly split
on the same issue (47% against versus 25.3% in favor).
What is evident from this poll results is that the
LDP and New Komeito are clearly heading towards
diametrically opposite stances on Article 9. It is also
apparent that members are becoming more cohesive
in these positions. The DPJ alone continues to suffer
from intra-party differences on whether or not to
amend Article 9. Leadership within the LDP confirms
this more hawkish stance. Compared to more moderate
faction leaders (like Kato Koichi, who does not see the
need for revising Article 9 and doubtful of SDF overseas
deployments beyond the traditional “attack on Japan
or surrounding areas” as premises), the LDP helm had
been occupied by characters like Ozawa Ichiro (whose
proposal for Japan’s normalization and contribution to
a UN standing force have raised so much furor in the
early 1990s) and current Prime Minister Koizumi who
is positive about revising Article 9 and more eager to
expand the SDF’s overseas role. (Kato, 1999; Ozawa,
1999) The position of DPJ leaders Kan and Hatoyama
is also closer to hawkish members of LDP. Hatoyama
Ref lections on the Human Condition: Change, Conflict and Modernity
The Work of the 2004/2005 API Fellows
(1999) favors revising Article 9 to recognize SDF as
a regular military for self-defense but is skeptical of
sending the SDF in overseas missions, whether they are
part of UN or not.
The LDP, New Komeito and DPJ since the 1990s
appeared more pragmatic and willing to hammer out
decisions while deftly avoiding direct debate on Article
9. The advent of coalition politics generated negotiated
political outcomes—that is by tradeoffs between the LDP,
Komeito and DPJ, often excluding the traditional leftist
parties (JCP and SDP) and marginalized conservative
elements within the LDP. For instance, the LDP used
the 1992 PKO bill as a negotiating point for inviting
DPJ and Komeito into the first coalition government. In
exchange for their endorsement, the DPJ wrote in very
stringent benchmarks for SDF dispatch (the so-called 5
PKO principles), while Komeito successfully pressed for
a 3-year freeze on regular peacekeeping activities. When
the issue of type of weapons and rules of engagement was
revisited for the anti terror legislation in 2001, the New
Komeito (as did DPJ) endorsed the measure allowing the
SDF to use their weapons to protect themselves, those
under their control (e.g. UN officials and refugees), and
their storage of weapons and munitions. New Komeito
also agreed to unfreeze the PKO functions to include
election supervision, supervising disarmament and
patrolling, but rejected the inclusion of maintenance of
peace and security as a PKO duty. In the deliberation
over how Japan could provide assistance to Iraq,
the New Komeito took the position that a new law is
needed rather than simply basing the dispatch under an
amended PKO law. In the end, New Komeito endorsed
the LDP’s bill in exchange for a promise to go slow
with any the ground deployment (perhaps in the hope
of diffusing intense opposition from its main lay base,
Souka Gakkai) (“Japan ruling coalition parties…” 12
November 2001). Although there is a strong push from
LDP stalwarts to further expand the range of PKO
activities that the SDF can undertake (to include core
PKO duties such as maintenance or peace and order)
or to upgrade the SDF’s rules of engagement to make
them at par with UN standards for PKO operations,
these initiatives find little resonance within the New
Komeito, and therefore unlikely to prosper. 12 The
imperative to courting minor coalition partners has
considerably prolonged the process of legislation. One
example is the emergency measures. Although LDP,
NK and Liberal Party have agreed as early as 2001 to
include this in their combined legislative agenda, the
bill wasn’t advanced for 2 years because of deadlock over
issue of firing of warning shots, complaints about vague
definition of emergency, among others. (“Defense bills
face rough…,” 18 April 2002)