Reflections on the Human Condition - Api-fellowships.org

222 SESSION IV
“safe area” (i.e. away from the major theater). In the case
of the Afghan campaign, the government tried to avoid
domestic criticism by restricting the MSDF’s logistical
operations in the Indian Ocean and Pakistan (again
away from the combat area) and by excluding transport
of weapons and munitions. 9 Under the 2003 Iraq
Special Measures, the SDF was dispatched to Samawah,
assessed by the government as relatively free from
major conflict. One of the issues that emerged during
Japan’s decade-long history of overseas deployment was
the issue of objectively assessing whether the security
situation in the area has deteriorated to the point where
troop withdrawal becomes imminent. As was the case in
Cambodia when the Khmer Rouge violated the ceasefire
agreement and in the Iraq dispatch when the Samawah
camp came under mortar attack, the government
remained steadfast in keeping the troops.
These policy outcomes also depict two enduring
principles: that the constitution prohibits Japan from
using force to settle international disputes; and from
engaging in collective self defense or collective security.
This non-use of force principle as incorporated in
subsequent legislation has come to mean: (1) prohibiting
SDF from engaging in activities overseas that constitute
use of force; (2) prohibiting the SDF from participating
in use of force operations by another country or
entity; (3) prohibiting the SDF from being drawn into
combat, that is when they have to fire their weapons.
Under the PKO law, the SDF can not maintain peace
and security in the areas where they are deployed, as
this is understood as breaching the non-use of force
principle (for this, they have to rely upon the presence
of another country’s PKO unit). In the deployment
for Indian Ocean and Iraq, SDF activities were limited
to transport and provision of logistics to US and
allied forces BUT NOT of weapons and munitions.
Under the surrounding areas law and amended cross
servicing agreement, SDF activities were also confined
to transporting logistics, excluding weapons and
munitions, but expressly rejecting SDF engaging in
combat operations alongside the Americans. Under the
Surrounding Areas Law, it is expressly indicated that
the SDF will conduct its rear area support activities in
Japanese territory or in the high seas, to emphasize its
dissociation from US operations. Along the same vein,
Japan can not send the SDF to any use of force operation
(similar to the allied efforts in the 1991 Persian Gulf
War), even if such was under UN auspices.
There are also restrictions on the type of weapons and
equipment the SDF can bring with them during their
mission and how they are going to use them (only in
self-defense, in defense of members of their unit, and
Ref lections on the Human Condition: Change, Conflict and Modernity
The Work of the 2004/2005 API Fellows
other people who come under their responsibility—e.g.
UN officials and refugees). Because of these limits,
much attention is paid on the security situation in the
area where they are going to be based. 10 In succeeding
deployments to the Indian Ocean (2001) and in
Iraq (2003), the government had to scout areas for
deployment where no actual fighting occurs or where
the risks of the SDF being drawn into combat is low.
Another check is the controversial, official government
interpretation that Article 9 prohibits Japan from
participating in collective self-defense and collective
security endeavors. Widely criticized as unrealistic
and farcical, the government steadfastly maintains this
interpretation even as the SDF and US forces move
increasingly towards greater military interoperability. For
instance, much of the debate around the 1997 guidelines
was slanted towards what types of rear-support activity
meet this ban on collective self-defense. 11 Is intelligence
or information sharing during between the SDF and
US forces during regional contingencies (many argue
that such is already occurring) or medical assistance
to wounded US soldiers acts of collective self-defense?
The current debate on missile defense is also deep into
the quagmire of collective self-defense limits. Because
missile defense requires accurate and timely detection
of incoming missile attacks, (for instance, a missile
fired by North Korea would reach its Japanese target
in 10 minutes) the US and Japan also have to integrate
their intelligence systems to make missile defense work,
thus provoking questions on whether such constitute
collective defense. (Hughes: 2004, 187)
To date, the Japanese government is also intensely
debating how it would proceed with its missile
defense program, which it is jointly undertaking with
the United States. The debate centers around one
of the long-standing hadome—the ban on weapons
export. Since the 1950s, the Japanese government has
checked the growth of the military-industrial complex
by prohibiting the export of weapons to countries at
war, those under UN sanctions and those that could
potentially engage in war. This ban extends even to
technologies with potential military application, thus
requiring many Japanese companies with joint projects
with overseas firms having to seek certification from
the MITI. Technologies jointly developed with the
US under the bilateral treaty (e.g. FX aircraft series
in the 1980s) are exempted from this ban. Under the
program (for which Japan is expected to spend a record
220 trillion yen), Japan will upgrade its current missile
defense capability with a newer generation of Patriots
and SAM 3 (purchased from the United States).
(“Military Transformation in Japan,” 11 May 2005) A