Reflections on the Human Condition - Api-fellowships.org

FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY
The author shares Sidels’ view of the Philippines as a
strong predatory state. However, this does not necessarily
mean that all those who control the state apparatus,
which includes local governments, plunder without
regard for the welfare of the citizenry. The Philippines
has around 1,700 local governments altogether. The
fact is that local politics in the Philippines is very diverse
and local politicians apply a mixture of formal and
informal resources (long-term and short-term personal
ties, election fraud, coercion, professional and personal
background, etc.) to gain political support. Needless to
say, not all of these local politicians use their predatory
powers.
Within a governing institution, there is always a tension
whether it tends to plunder citizen’s wealth or to foster
economy by promoting transactions. This dilemma
suggests that there are two extreme poles within those a
political institution could exist as an economic system:
predatory and developmental. Weingast (1995, 1)
observes that a “government strong enough to protect
property rights and enforce contracts is also strong
enough to confiscate the wealth of its citizens.”
According to Evans (1995, 44), predatory states, on one
hand, are the ones that “extract large amounts of otherwise
investable surplus while providing so little in the way of
“collective goods” in return that they impede economic
transformation.” Developmental states, on the other
hand, are the ones that “foster long-term entrepreneurial
perspectives among private elites by increasing incentives
to engage in transformative investments and lowering
risks. These states may not be immune to using social
surplus for the ends of incumbents and their friends
rather than those of the citizenry as a whole, but, on
balance, the consequences of their actions promote
rather than impede transformation.”
This study adapts Evans’s predatory/developmental
definitions for local politicians and local governments
in the Philippines. Although the national government
makes formal rules and implements them, a local
government also passes and implements annual
budgets, local ordinances and resolutions and makes
decisions on local matters. It is also responsible to
formulate and implement a local development plan.
Predatory local politicians/governments may extract
investable surplus in forms of corruptions or misuse
while providing so little in the way of “collective goods”
in return that they impede economic transformation,
while developmental local politicians/governments
try to foster long-term entrepreneurial perspectives in
THE STATE, DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION
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local communities by increasing incentives to engage
in transformative investments and lowering risks.
Many local governments/politicians could be located
somewhere in-between. These developmental local
politicians/governments may not be immune to using
social surplus for the ends of incumbents and their
friends rather than those of the citizenry as a whole, but
on balance the consequences of their actions promote
rather than impede economic transformation.
The hypotheses of the present research are that there
are variations of local governments/politicians from
predatory to developmental to in-between in the
Philippines (see Appendix, Figure 1 and 2), and that
the nature of reciprocal relationships between political
leaders and residents depends on to what extent
implementation mechanism works. The time factor is
considered. One local government or local politician
could move from one category to another in the time
being.
The study focuses on the importance of institutions
such as formal rules (laws, ordinances), informal rules
(patron-cliental ties, kinship, local customs, etc) and
implementation mechanism of those rules (meaning
the extent to which those formal and informal rules
are strictly implemented) in order to ensure long-term
economic performance of a local government. Within
a certain time frame, these formal/informal rules and
implementation mechanisms would change as well as
socio-economic environment.
At the same time this study focuses on the role of the
local chief executives. They are formally authorized to
shape development plans and implement projects as
well as perform other administrative tasks under the
laws. They also have extensive appointive power. Their
decisions on local matters are very influential. Their
formal authorities in the area of local development
(e.g. signing contracts and loans) are significant among
other local players. The character of a local government
normally reflects the preferences of the chief executive.
Whether a chief executive possess as the ability to
maintain political supports from the local councils,
local officials, and constituents, and to fully utilize
existing external ties or to create new ones is crucial for
the results of local programs and projects.
METHODOLOGY OF CASE STUDIES
This research focuses on long-term local economic
development projects with emphasis on the political
aspects.
Ref lections on the Human Condition: Change, Conflict and Modernity
The Work of the 2004/2005 API Fellows