Reflections on the Human Condition - Api-fellowships.org

key issue for Japan is that there is no preventing the
US to share the MD technology it jointly developed
with Japan to its allies under its Theater Missile Defense
program. This arrangement clearly runs counter to the
ban on weapons export.
Taken in its entirety, the changes in the SDF’s missions
and roles since 1992 have been dramatic yet cautious.
Although the SDF can now engage in PKO, the
enabling law contains very stringent benchmarks for
SDF dispatch (including prior ceasefire agreement,
invitation by host government) and a limited category
of activities that the SDF can undertake (which does
not constitute use of force). This lingering reluctance to
fully utilize the SDF as the state’s instrument is evident
in the fact that PKO and humanitarian activities
remain ancillary (as opposed to primary) functions for
the SDF. As such, requests for overseas deployment
have to be weighed against SDF’s force and equipment
capacity for homeland defense. For instance, the recent
request for SDF PKO dispatch to Sudan was turned
down by the Defense Agency because the SDF’s already
committed its spare resources to the Indian Ocean and
Iraq dispatch (“Diplomats playing politics,” 12 February
2005). Thus far, there has been no SDF casualty during
overseas deployment, but judging from the public’s
mostly negative reaction to the dispatch in war torn
Iraq, it is likely that the government will take even yet
more cautious stance towards future deployments.
BILATERALISM AND THE US CARD
In the last 15 years or so, Japan has been improving its
defense capability quantitatively and qualitatively under
the rubric of strengthening US-Japan security relations.
Authors, however, are divided as to the underlying
motive behind this development. Some argue that
Japan’s focus on bilateralism has given nationalist
forces an avenue to indirectly work on their goal of
an independent defense. (DiFilippo: 2002, 97 and
Leitenberg: 1996, 26) similarly saw the historic passage
of the PKO law as serving the conservative leadership’s
objective for the SDF to become a regular military.
Hughes (2004) meanwhile sees these developments as a
means for Japan to address the asymmetry of the alliance,
thereby giving Japan a more equal role with the US.
Rather than assuming Japan as passive recipient of US
pressure, Richard Tanter (2004) and DiFilippo (2002)
argue that local politicians have been actively utilizing
these external influences in order to pursue long-held
desire for Japan to become a normal country (with a
professional regular military under civilian control that
can be used as an instrument of state policy) just like
other advanced industrialized democracies. The latter
THE STATE, DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION
223
foresees that in the future Japan will further militarize
in response to its security imperatives (i.e. go nuclear)
regardless of US inclinations.
Hook (1996) and McCormack (2004) consider the
strengthening of US-Japan relations as playing more
into the US’s strategic interests rather than Japan’s.
The recent enactment committing Japan to support US
operations in the region, its involvement in the missile
defense program and move towards greater military-tomilitary
integration, are seen as tactics in containing
an ascendant China. The deployments in Iraq, despite
strong public opposition also depict how Japan has been
increasingly playing into the US’s hegemonic plans. The
Koizumi government disregards the staggering financial
costs of the Iraq deployment and the ballistic missile
defense program, and the long-term consequences of its
closer ties with the US to regional stability. It has been
argued that enhanced US-Japan cooperation will trigger
a regional arms race, which in the long-run increases
rather than eases regional tension. (McCormack, 2004;
DiFilippo, 2002)
A strengthened Japan-US alliance does not only confer onesided
benefits. Some authors (Hughes and Fukushima,
2004; Soeya, 1998) see the US-Japan security alliance
as the best and thus far, irreplaceable means for Japan
to meet its security needs within domestic normative
constraints. Despite the asymmetry, the Japanese
government has sufficient room for hedging tactics
within the bilateral arrangement. The 1997 guidelines
and the decisions to send troops to the Indian Ocean
and Iraq were indications of an “adjusted strategic
bargain”—that Japan gets its security guarantee with the
US, but in exchange must support US power projection
in the region. (Hughes and Fukushima: 2004, 72)
Despite the government’s new security articulations
(concern for regional stability and international peace
and order, domestic emergencies and terrorist attacks),
Japan continues to formulate responses primarily
within the prism of its ties with the US. Japan’s active
participation in UN peacekeeping operations, as well
as in various multilateral and bilateral dialogues is its
way of coping with its militarist past (which strains
its relations with neighboring countries) and being
involved in crafting a stable regional environment. But
these are seen as supplementing rather than supplanting
Japan-US ties. (Soeya: 1998, 222)
MAKING GOOD NEIGHBORS
Throughout much of the Cold War, Japan’s diplomatic
overtures to neighboring Asian countries relied primarily
on the “low politics” of trade and investment. Security
Ref lections on the Human Condition: Change, Conflict and Modernity
The Work of the 2004/2005 API Fellows