Reflections on the Human Condition - Api-fellowships.org

228 SESSION IV
proposed that the constitution should acknowledge
Japan’s right of collective self-defense, but Japan must
defend itself independently and that US forces should
not be stationed in Japan. Hatoyama’s position is very
similar to what was earlier articulated by former Prime
Minister Nakasone who argued for Article 9 revision to
acknowledge the SDF’s existence as a “military” and to
recognize Japan’s right to collective self-defense. (Itoh:
2000, 317)
In 2000, debate over constitutional revision reached
a critical mass. The government formed a Diet
commission (in the lower and upper house) to study
about constitutional revision. The Commissions’ report,
which came out in early 2005 depicted a consensus that
the 1947 constitution ought to be revised, but fell short
of endorsing the revision of Article 9. Though greatly
marginalized, pacifist elements favor the retention of
Article 9 as a cornerstone of Japan’s commitment to
unarmed neutrality. (Hook and McCormack: 2001,
31) They are mostly concerned about how Asian
neighbors, who have long held Article 9 as a symbol of
Japan’s promise not to engage in war again, would react
if it was amended. Among those who take this position
include: Article 9 association, an umbrella network of
religious lay groups and peace organizations. On the
other side are conservatives, who are willing to retain
the nonuse of force clause in Article 9, but are seeking
accommodation for Japan’s international responsibility.
This conservative current includes Keidanren, Japan’s
business federation, which came up with a statement
favoring revision of Article 9 to include recognition of:
(a) the SDF as a military, with enumerated functions
such as to protect sovereignty, and to contribute and
cooperate with international community in activities
for international peace, (b) Japan’s sovereign right of
self defense. (Nippon Keidanren, 2005) The Institute of
International Policy Studies, a think thank associated
with former Prime Minister Nakasone, similarly
proposes recognition of the SDF as a regular military
for defense and for contribution to international peace
and stability. In addition, it also proposes for a new
civilian control clause naming the Prime Minister as
commander-in-chief, and Diet approval for use of force
operations under the UN and for humanitarian relief.
According to the Institute’s proposal, the Diet retains
the power to limit and control the exercise of the right
of self defense.
The political parties are also eager to contribute to the
debate, with a promise of a constitutional proposal later
this year for LDP, and early next year for DPJ. The draft
outline of the LDP research committee for constitution
called for renaming the SDF as “armed forces for
Ref lections on the Human Condition: Change, Conflict and Modernity
The Work of the 2004/2005 API Fellows
self defense” and for introducing the use of right of
collective self defense (“Panel eyes new name…” 7 July
2005). New Komeito has stated previously that it will
adhere to the interpretation of Article 9 but is amenable
to writing new clauses that allows for SDF contribution
to international peace. The DPJ meanwhile makes no
mention of position on Article 9 in its party manifesto.
THE DEBATE FROM THE GROUND: PUBLIC
OPINION ON THE CHANGES OF SDF’S ROLES
Many authors have argued that Japanese unique sense of
pacifism is rooted from their experience during World
War II. Japan’s strong grassroots movements that
denounce the use of weapons of mass destruction and
the presence of US troops in Okinawa are manifestations
of this pacifist strain. However, it is also different from
other types of pacifism (unarmed and nonviolence)
in that it accepts a limited role for its de facto armed
forces the SDF. Berger (1998) and Keddel (1993, 122),
more accurately refer to this aspect of Japanese political
culture as anti-militarism, which is manifested in terms
of: (1) strong support for Article 9 which opposes
the establishment of a regular military and the SDF’s
utilization as an instrument for state policy; (2) tolerance
of SDF presence for as long it is configured only for
minimum self-defense and not dispatched overseas; and
(3) SDF performing mainly nonmilitary functions. In
many ways, this aversion to military and its association
with violence is so embedded in Japan’s psyche, that
discussions even intellectual or artistic discourse is
sensitive to this taboo. Government officials prior to the
1990s who make public pronouncements for instance,
contrary to this implicit dictum, are censured heavily.
Unlike political culture, which tends to be deepseated
and is formed over a long period of time, public
opinion is more transient and issue driven. When public
opinion is tracked over long periods of time, it can also
function as a window to how political culture at the
base is shaping up. How has public opinion changed
since 1992, and to what extent does this reflect shift in
the underlying political culture? This section examines
the results of regular public opinion surveys by Japan’s
major newspapers (e.g. Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi and
Nikkei), other news organizations (e.g. Kyodo) and the
Prime Minister’s Office on two broad concerns. First,
public responses to legislative and other policy initiatives
of consequence to the SDF’s role are examined. These
include survey results prior to and after the Cambodian,
Indian Ocean and Iraq dispatches. Second, survey results
clustered according to thematic elements of Japan’s
antimilitarist political culture will also be examined.
These thematic elements are: (1) position on Article 9;