Reflections on the Human Condition - Api-fellowships.org

These results depict the tenacity of the Japanese public’s
anti-militarist political culture. Many still want to
maintain Article 9’s war renouncing provision. The
Japanese public has grown to accept and understand
that the SDF is integral to maintaining national
security, but do not invest as much importance to this
SDF role as they do with disaster relief. A huge part
of the people’s positive reviews of the SDF emanate
from their commendable performance in disaster relief
operations. While there is an increasing acceptance
of “international contribution” as the SDF’s ancillary
tasks, support for SDF overseas deployment clearly has
serious qualifications in terms of purpose and mandate.
SDF PKO participation and in disaster relief abroad
(non-use of force operations) and operations with
UN mandate enjoy increasing support, but as was the
example of the opposition in the Iraq deployment, the
Japanese public expressed reservations when confronted
with the question of SDF deployment that do not meet
these parameters.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN JAPAN: THEN
AND NOW
The relations between the Japanese civilian authorities
and the SDF defy standard categorization of civilian
control in a democratic polity. Civilian control is
defined as military subordination to policy decisions by
elected civilian rulers. The legal cornerstone of civilian
control in Japan is Article 66 in the constitution which
posits that the Prime Minister, designated commanderin
chief of the SDF, and the Japan Defense Agency
(JDA) director must always be civilians. At the executive
branch, the National Defense Council, the Ministerial
Council on Comprehensive Security and the National
Security Council comprise the locus of cabinet-level
decision making. However, within these bodies, the
highest ranking SDF officer has no formal membership,
but he could be invited to provide testimonies. (Gow:
1993, 59)
During the Cold War, control of the SDF was largely
delegated by politicians to bureaucrats. Apart from the
JDA that directly supervises the SDF, the MOFA and
MITI also exercise bureaucratic oversight. Among these
ministries, the JDA’s status is inferior as indicated by
its sub-ministerial designation. MOFA sets the agenda
on security policy in general while MITI administrative
control over weapons and defense technology
procurement matters. The JDA lacked institutional
autonomy. Its internal bureau, which is in -charge of
strategic planning and promotions, was composed
mostly of personnel seconded from the MOFA, MITI
and the police. (Katzenstein: 1996, 106) Even within the
THE STATE, DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION
231
Defense Agency, SDF officers have weak access to their
civilian Director. Within the JDA, civilian bureaucrats
are also powerful in that they decide what weapons
and how much munitions troops carry with them
during any mission. Recently, the Defense Agency’s
status vis-à-vis MOFA was elevated somewhat with the
introduction of 2+2 council, which coordinates matters
pertaining to the US-Japan alliance. Thus the US-Japan
framework has given both SDF officers and the Defense
agency better leverage in decision making than what is
domestically feasible.
There are visible changes in the nature of civil-military
interface in Japan after 1992. Politicians are taking
the lead in security decision making again. The Prime
Minister’s role also achieved new heights as coordination
of policies and across ministries on security matters
became a premium. The addition of a cabinet secretariat
with separate expertise on security (distinct from MOFA)
point to the growing importance of this policy aspect.
(Hughes: 2004, 164; Hosoya: 2004; Kondo: 2004)
The Diet, which previously did not play a constructive
role in setting security and defense policy, is becoming
important. Legislation authorizing deployment for PKO
and other operations (in Afghanistan and Iraq) were
deliberated and decided through political compromises
by the coalition parties and the opposition within the
Diet. Authors like Hook (1996) however, discount this
seeming upswing role of the Diet. According to him,
the PKO deployments in Cambodia and elsewhere is
strengthening of executive and Cabinet hand in security
policy making, at the Diet’s expense. Under the new
arrangement, the Cabinet can drastically alter the SDF’s
missions into gray areas, without referring the matter to
the Diet. Within the bureaucracy, the Defense Agency’s
status vis-à-vis the other civilian ministries have
improved. (Hughes: 2004, 16) Regardless, the MOFA
remains the lead ministry for security policy, and will
likely steer Japan towards expanded cooperation with
US under the alliance framework, rather than through
alternative multilateral security frameworks. (Hughes:
2004, 163)
Despite the rapid expansion of its roles and much
improved public image, the SDF as an institution
still faces serious concerns about its existence. In the
past decade, the SDF has been moving into roles that
are dissociated from violence, hence away from the
traditional notion of what a “professional military
establishment” does. (Fruhstuck and Ben Ari, 2002)
It tries to connect with society by adopting functions
that do not connect to the use of organized force—
e.g. disaster relief, public service and peacekeeping.
This effort to obfuscate the SDF’s military nature
Ref lections on the Human Condition: Change, Conflict and Modernity
The Work of the 2004/2005 API Fellows