Reflections on the Human Condition - Api-fellowships.org

232 SESSION IV
is evident in other ways. First, is through the use of
doublespeak—among themselves and another for non-
SDF in an effort to “civilianize” the organization—and
in appearance (i.e. not wearing their uniforms off base).
In its information and public relations drives, the SDF
also projects itself as “helpful and harmless”, thus
eliminating its association with violence.
Efforts to provide the legal framework for SDF’s
expanded role are also lagging behind. PKO and
other humanitarian/disaster relief missions (domestic
or overseas) are not considered primary tasks for the
SDF. While the government has not been remised in
providing supplemental appropriation, the SDF’s force
structure remains not well-suited for these additional
missions. For instance, although the SDF has
successfully reduced its preparation time for overseas
deployment (the Iraq preparation was 6 months, the
tsunami relief took 1 month), it still takes a long time to
prepare compared to other countries. (Kondo, 2004) At
issue is the SDF’s effectivity in discharging its functions.
Moreover, given current security threats (e.g. ballistic
missile attack) that require a quicker response time,
there is a need to streamline civilian control procedures.
Recently, the Diet approved a measure authorizing the
JDA director to issue a standing intercept order to the
SDF commander in charge of ballistic missile defense
in the event of an imminent attack on Japan. (“Lower
house Oks bills…” 14 June 2005)
CONCLUSION
Since 1992, Japan has been inexorably taking the welltrodden
path to normalization. The past decade saw
the overseas deployment of SDF in Asia and beyond,
unprecedented since Japan’s disastrous involvement
in World War II. Its alliance with the US has reached
unprecedented levels of military-to-military integration,
which though falling short of the NATO ideal, is
drawing very close, particularly in the light of their joint
missile defense program. The SDF currently stands as
one of the biggest, most modern and formidable armed
platforms (in terms of its budget and force structure) in
the world.
Yet, Japan’s march to normalization remains hampered
by tenacious antimilitarist norms at the elite and mass
public levels. Despite the entrenched acceptance of
deploying SDF personnel as international contribution,
the public and the elite policymakers remain divided
over how to reconcile this desire to be a responsible
global player, with the country’s historical commitment
to pacifism (that is, non-use of force in settling
international disputes). At the core of this dilemma is
Ref lections on the Human Condition: Change, Conflict and Modernity
The Work of the 2004/2005 API Fellows
the fear that should Article 9 be amended or abolished,
it would unleash dormant nationalist forces that will
lead the country to the path of aggression. Optimists
who want the Article 9 re-interpreted or amended argue
that Japan’s democracy has matured sufficiently to be
able to discuss, debate and decide on this fundamental
issue, without raising the specter of World War II
demons. Another issue is how Japan can continue
to subscribe to this antimilitarist norm, given that
normalization would and could only proceed under
the US-Japan alliance framework. Skeptics worry that
given the US’s aggressive predilection, in due time
Japan would be entangled in use of force operations
for which it could not back out. Under an atmosphere
of greater public sensitivity towards security matters,
and greater willingness by politicians to discuss them,
Japan’s search for a global identity would be a long and
difficult process ahead.
At a personal level, I am buoyed by the changes in the
security decision making pattern in Japan featuring the
Prime Minister and Diet politicians taking charge. As
an advocate of democracy, I believe that this process
injects more accountability as elected politicians, not
bureaucrats, are making decisions on security matters.
Moreover, that security issues are openly discussed
and debated by parties and by the media generates a
level of transparency which in the end is healthy in
any democracy. Though raucous and messy, security
decision-making is at least brought out into the open
rather than being secretly negotiated by unaccountable
bureaucrats.
I predict that it only a matter of time before a critical
mass is reached among the Japanese public and among
the policymaking elites in favor of amending Article 9,
and endowing the SDF a legal personality and mandate
to undertake expanded overseas missions. Japan’s
normalization will proceed, but towards a more active
global security role in peacekeeping operations and in
international humanitarian relief. The government’s
strong commitment to limit SDF deployment in nonuse
of force missions alone and to carefully draw an
imaginary line on the type of assistance it could give
the US, will be increasingly put to test. I am very
confident of the political maturity of Japanese public
and democratic institutions. It will be a hard sell for the
most ardent nationalists to bring Japan into the same
aggressive path reminiscent of World War II given these
strong democratic values and institutions. However, I
am wary of how the Japanese government can remain
anchored in this non-use of force conviction within
the parameters of its bilateral relations with the US. In
recent years, the US government under President Bush