Reflections on the Human Condition - Api-fellowships.org

230 SESSION IV
dangerous situation in Iraq (30.7% in the Kyodo poll,
and 22% in Mainichi poll). Many of those polled also
cited that the PM’s explanation for the SDF dispatch
was unsatisfactory (64% for the Asahi poll, 62% for the
Mainichi poll and 63% for the Nikkei poll).
What explains this opposition? The SDF dispatch
occurred outside acceptable parameters. The campaign
was not backed by the UN. Although the SDF would
be performing the same reconstruction tasks as in PKO,
their deployment in an area where conflict still rages
increases that the SDF will engage in combat (a prospect
long avoided by the public). This aversion towards the
SDF using violence, even to defend them, is something
that the Japanese public appears very sensitive about.
A parallel situation in 1992 in Cambodia, when the
Khmer Rouge broke the ceasefire agreement and when
two Japanese aid workers were killed, generated a
similar public concern that the place is not safe enough
for troops to be deployed in.
A second area of public opinion trend regards Japan-US
relations. According to the PM Office surveys, public
support for the treaty in conjunction with SDF presence
as the most appropriate way of defending Japan has
steadily increased. From a 40.9% in 1969, this figure
has increased to 69.2% in 1984 then 62.4% and 68.8%
in 1991 and 1994 respectively. Support for the 3 bills
in 1999 substantiating Japan’s commitment to the
revised guidelines also was high at 65% (according to
the Kyodo April 1999 poll). However, a poll taken by
Asahi in March 1999 depicted split tendency on the
issue (37% in support, versus 43 % against). In the two
polls, among the most cited explanation for supporting
the bills was their necessity for Japan’s security (39.4%
in the Kyodo poll, and 45% in the Asahi poll). This
means that the Japanese public clearly understands the
usefulness of the treaty to defending Japan.
In recent years, many newspaper polls have pointed
that increasing number of respondents favoring
constitutional revision. Compared to the 1986 Asahi
poll for instance where proponents for revision was at
29%, by 1997 the Asahi and Jiji polls reveal that prorevision
have risen to over 40%. The Yomiuri yearly
polls have registered a majority pro-revision since 2000
(at 60%), while for Asahi the pro-revision majority was
breached in 2004 (53%). In subsequent years, those
who favor revision have consistently hovered above
50% while those who oppose revision have dwindled
between 20%-30%. While majority favor revising the
1947 Constitution, majority want to retain Article 9.
The Mainichi 1994, Asahi 1997, Asahi 2001, and Asahi
2004 polls registered 60% to high 70 % favoring that
Ref lections on the Human Condition: Change, Conflict and Modernity
The Work of the 2004/2005 API Fellows
Article 9 be kept as it is. However in recent polls (taken
in 2005) by Asahi, Jiji and JAPOR, the pro-retention
number has gone down to 40%-50%. It is early to tell
whether this downward trend of pro-retention will
continue, but it appears that from the 1994-2004 at
least, support for Article 9 remains strong. Among those
who favor revision of Article 9, many have pointed out
the need to “recognize the SDF’s existence” (34% in
the 2001 Yomiuri poll, 32% in the Mainichi 2002 poll
and 48% in the JAPOR 2005 poll) and “recognize
international contribution” (52% in the Yomiuri 2004
poll and 31% in the Asahi 2004 poll and 29% in the
JAPOR 2005 poll) as types of changes. These changes
seek to modify clause 2 of Article 9, and suggest that
even among those who are pro-revision would want to
retain clause 1 (which renounces war and use of force in
settling international disputes).
Despite the Article 9 clause 2’s prohibition for Japan
not to have a military, only a small declining minority
consider the SDF as unconstitutional. From 28%
in the Asahi 1992 poll, this number has gone down
further to 13% in 2001(Asahi) and 7% in 2005 (Asahi).
Alongside this firm belief of SDF’s constitutionality,
the proportion of people having a positive impression
of the SDF has also steadily increased. The PMO polls
from 1967, 1975 and 1984, reveal that over 60% to
70% have good/not bad impression with the SDF.
From 36% in the Yomiuri 1986 poll, the number
increased to 53% in 1994 (Yomiuri) and 67% in 2004
(Yomiuri). In the PMO polls since 1969, the majority
(above 50%) consistently and accurately understood
that the main purpose for which the SDF was created
was for maintenance of national security. Curiously,
an increasing number (12.7% in 1969, 13.6% in
1984 and 23.8% in 1994) is also identifying “disaster
relief” as an SDF core task. When the PMO surveys
added “international contribution” as a category in the
1994 and 1996 surveys, a fewer proportion chose this
category (5.7% and 17.3% respectively) than disaster
relief (23.8% and 66% respectively). When asked in
the 1996 survey about which SDF secondary mission is
most important, majority chose disaster relief. Majority
of the respondents also chose disaster relief as the most
useful role of SDF (consistently above 70% since the
1967 survey to 1994) as well as the area in which the
SDF has its most constructive role (91% in the 1996
survey). By contrast, less than 10% of the respondents
identified maintenance of national security, the SDF’s
core task, as its most useful role. A 2004 Yomiuri poll
similarly identifies disaster relief (89%) as the reason
behind positive reviews of the SDF, compared to only
29% for efforts in national defense.