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TRUPACT I1 SWB or metal waste box; and 1,255 grams in a POC) and TypeB shipping<br />

containers With up to 6,000 grams <strong>of</strong> WG Pu. The predominant radioactive materials that will<br />

be found in the Building 991 Complex are isotopes <strong>of</strong> plutonium blended with some americium<br />

rather than uranium. As shown in NSTR-011-98, the gram quantity radiological thresholds for<br />

23% and 241Am are less than comparable uranium isotope radiological thresholds. In addition,<br />

the radiological consequences <strong>of</strong> uranium in Type B shipping containers or waste containers is<br />

bounded by equivalent containers <strong>of</strong> WG Pu. For the above reasons, the container inventories <strong>of</strong><br />

uranium isotopes are not <strong>of</strong> interest.<br />

Since the "'Pu content <strong>of</strong> WGPu is over 92% (see SARAH, Ref. 9), the upper bound<br />

WG Pu content <strong>of</strong> 5 TRU waste 55-gallon waste dnuns (approximately 920 grams <strong>of</strong> "'Pu),<br />

1 POC container (approximately 1,155 grams <strong>of</strong> "'Pu), 4 TRUPACT I1 SWB containers<br />

(approximately 1,180 grams <strong>of</strong> "%.I), or 4 metal waste boxes (approximately 1,180 grams <strong>of</strong><br />

?Pu), would exceed the Hazard Category 2 threshold for "'Pu, even if a criticality is precluded<br />

Since the Building 991 Complex can potentially store thousands <strong>of</strong> waste containers, the<br />

complex can be considered a Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility. This categorization would be<br />

true even if the waste containers had inventories closer to LLW rather than the upper bound<br />

WG Pu content <strong>of</strong> TRU waste.<br />

Due to the potential "% content <strong>of</strong> the Building991 Complex waste containers, the<br />

Building 991 Complex is considered a Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility based on exceeding<br />

the Hazard Category 2 radiological threshold for the isotope even though DOE-STD-1027-92<br />

indicates that the inventory found in the TypeB shipping containers does not have to be<br />

considered in the complex inventory.<br />

4.4.3 Hazard Evaluation<br />

The hazard identification process in NSTR-011-98 identified 44 hazards or energy<br />

sources for the Building 991 Complex. Of the 44 hazards, 22 hazards or energy sources were<br />

characterized as Standard Industrial Hazards, which did not need to be carried forward for<br />

further hazard evaluation or analysis. The remaining 22 hazards or energy sources were M er<br />

evaluated using a hazard evaluation process prior to performing an accident analysis for the<br />

Building 991 Complex. The hazards <strong>of</strong> most interest were Hazard 4 4 Categow I and I1 SNM,<br />

and Hazard 4B, Waste Containers. The remaining hazards and energy sources either act on these<br />

hazards (e.g., Hazard 7 4 Vehicles. Material Handling Eauipment) or are subsets <strong>of</strong> these<br />

hazards (e.g., Hazard 5D, PvroDhoric Materials). In support <strong>of</strong> the hazard evaluation process,<br />

logic diagrams were developed displaying the manner in which each <strong>of</strong> the remaining hazards<br />

and energy sources acted on Hazard 4A and Hazard 4B. It was not considered necessary to<br />

determine how other hazards and energy sources acted on the chemicals since chemicals were<br />

considered to be Standard Industrial Hazards.<br />

Initiating event trees were developed to link 20 <strong>of</strong> the 22 hazards/energy sources with<br />

releases <strong>of</strong> the two radioactive material hazards (Le., Category I and I1 SNM and waste<br />

containers). These event trees examined basic phenomenological mechanisms leading to failures<br />

<strong>of</strong> the SNM or waste containers. Paths through the event trees were preliminary accident<br />

Revision 1<br />

4-13 Building 99 1 Complex FSAR<br />

Scptcrnber 1993 I<br />

~

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