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closure project manager - Document Request - U.S. Department of ...

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BASES<br />

APPLICATION<br />

TO SAFETY<br />

ANALYSTS<br />

{continued)<br />

Revision I<br />

Saptcrnber 1999<br />

The faciiitv flammable gas edosion dominant accident scenario nrzsents low risk<br />

to the public and the collocated workers but high risk to thc immcdiate worhcr<br />

The FEVS does not mitigate accident conseauences for thc immediate workcr<br />

Therefore, thc dominant s~enario risk aspects <strong>of</strong> the facilitv flammable gas<br />

exulosion cannot be mi tigated bv the FEVS.<br />

The radiological dose mnseauences <strong>of</strong> fire scenarios (other than those that occur<br />

at the dock during shiminP or receivina) can be mitigated by the FEVS Dunng<br />

the conduct <strong>of</strong> the ShiuDhg and receiving activities, the Room 170 dock doors are<br />

open and the system is not credited for Room 147 or Roorn 170 accident<br />

mitigation. However. the likelihood <strong>of</strong> fires occuninn in Room 147 or Room 170<br />

during conduct <strong>of</strong> these activities is small comDared to the likelihood <strong>of</strong> fires<br />

occurring during maintenance activities or durinv general, uiiatteiided waste<br />

container stome. This low fire likelihood is attributed to die cons~it personnel<br />

artcndance during the conduct <strong>of</strong> the receiDt and ShiDment activities and the<br />

absence <strong>of</strong> significant ignition sources in the Room 170 activities (use <strong>of</strong> electric<br />

forklifts and handcarts). Therefore. the bounding buildino interior fires that are<br />

evduated in the dew analysis are considered to be mitipated by die FEVS.<br />

The nietal containers that are received bv the facilik for sowe or st3gin~ are<br />

either Tipe A or Tv~e B shipDing containers. These containers are not vulnerable<br />

to MIS <strong>of</strong> less than four feet or thim feet. resDectivelv. Therefore. the onlv mill<br />

vulnerability <strong>of</strong> the containers rests with the Tme A containers that are lifted or<br />

stacked above four feet (Le. third tier or hider). Stacking ouentions above the<br />

second tier are not conducted while the dock doors are OD~II and the recehiiig and<br />

shiming activities are not exroeded to raise the containers above four feet<br />

Therefore. the building interior, normal operation spills that are evaluated in the<br />

safetv analvsis are mitisated bv the FEVS.<br />

Metal containers that are moved during operations are esroosed to a potential for<br />

forklift tine ~unchins. These container ouncture scenarios can occur whiie the<br />

dock doors are open during; receiDt and shipment operations or can occur while the<br />

dock doors are closed during. other operzrtions. Metal waste containers that 3n'<br />

moved during: orm-ations create a potential for container hvdrolren csulosions each<br />

time the containers are touchod. As in the case <strong>of</strong> the punctu~-~ accident scenarios,<br />

container hvdronen explosion scenarios can occur whiie the dock doors are owl<br />

during receiot and shiDment operations or m occur while the dock doors arc<br />

closed during other oDerations.<br />

A-5 1 Building 991 Complex FSAR I<br />

APpenaA I

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