closure project manager - Document Request - U.S. Department of ...

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Movernent of waste containers from a transport vehicle at the dock to a staginp area
in Room 170.
Movement of waste containers from a staging area in Room 1’70 to a transport vehicle
at the dock.
Movement of ShN Type B shipping containers from a transport vehicle a? the dock
to a vault staging location in the north area of the faci1it.V.
Movement of SNhil TvPeB shiuping containers from a vault staging location in the
north area of the facilitv to a transport vehicle at the dock.
All other container movement within Room 170 or fromho Room 170 are not considered to be
part of receipt and shkment otmations.
A control to restrict all over~’ons, other than receipt andshivment, in Rooms 147 and
I70 when dack hurs are open along with a control to res- waste container siaeking above a
second tier clurin~ receipt and shipment are imvosed to reduce the likelihood of spill scenanos
in the area while the dock doors are open. Since all waste containers permitted in the facilitv are
aualifred to survive falls of four feet or less (Type B shipDing; containers and POCs are Qualified
to 30 feet). restricting; stacking above a second tier ensures that containers are not lifted above
four feet. Therefore. it is postulated that container soill scenarios occurring during the conduct
of receiving or shiming operations are Drecluded. If the operations restrictions are imposed. all
facilitv. contaker ODerations-induced sr>ills can be analvzed crediting: a stage of HEPA filtration
Another conservatism deals with the event likelihood. Failure of the metd waste
containms resulting in a release of radioactive material could be argued to be an unZihZy event
Even though there have been incidents where containers were dropped or fell in the past, the
majority of past events have been of relatively low energy, typically resulting in the denting of
containers with no loss of containment. If this scenario conservatism were removed, the risk
class for the CW would be reduced by one level but the risk classes for the MOI and IW would
remain the same.
In summary, crediting the Buifriinp 991 fiZtered aJzaust ventilation system and _fzciliq
confiwrdion controk would yield Risk Class III results for the CW.
Puncture Scenario 1 - LLW. TRU. POC, and Type B Container Punctures (Case B)
A radioactive material spill is postulated to occur as a result of puncturing a TRU waste
container. The puncture of the container may occur as a result of the container being impacted
and punctured by material handling equipment while loading, unloading, andor transferring the
container from its receipthhipment area to its storagdstaging area. The puncture may occur in
all storagdstaging areas in the building as well as the dock areas during receipdshlpment
operations. The forklift error results in a puncture, by the forklift tines, of two adjacent TRL!
waste drums located on a pallet. A fraction of the contents of the punctured waste containers are
postulated to “flow” through the breach onto the groundfloor.
4-35 Building 991 Complex FS.m