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Revision I Scptcmber 1999 Figure 2-13 Building 991 Roof Plenum Deluge System Flow Diagram Figure 2-14 Building 985 Filter Plenum Deluge System Flow Diagram Building 99 1 Complex FSAR I
Each plenum has two systems, an automatic deluge system at the particle impingement separation screens (demister screen) and a manually activated deluge system upstream of the first stage of HEPA filters. The Building 991 roof plenum only has one stage of HEPA filters while the Building 985 plenum has two stages of HEPAs. The demister chambers for the Building 991 roof plenum and Building 985 are shown in Figures 2-13 and 2-14. These chambers have nozzles located approximately six inches upstream of the demister screen. The spray pattern is designed so that a water curtain is discharged to cool the incoming air. The spray may also facilitate particulate removal. The capabilitv to observe spray oatterns of the automatic portion of the deluge svstem in the Building 991 roof plenum is significantly impaired due tu the close prorcimih7 of the filter stage to the plenum wall. That is, the inlet plenum wall is verv close to the filter stage blocking view of some of the spray nozzles due to limitations of .line of sight. Also. nozzle smass near observation ports degrade the visibilitv of the spray for nozzles further awav from the observation port. The automatic plenum deluge systems are defense-in-deDth systems and are nut credited controls in the safe@ analysis. The adecluacv of this confirnation for a credited safetv system would be questionable since nozzle sprav patterns for some portions ofthe plenum may not mitigate high air temperature or hot ember and flvinp brand impacts on iilters (i.e.. certain areas of the filter stage may not be cooled or protected against hot particulates). Heat detectors located in the inlet ducts to the filter plenum actuate the automatic deluge valves. When high temperature air passes over the heat detector, the contacts within the detector .change state at 190°F, which sends a signal to the associated deluge control panel. The deluge control panel for the Building 991 roof plenum is located in Room 130 and the panel for the Building 985 plenum deluge system is located in Building 985. The deluge control panel simultaneously sends an alarm to the CAS and FDC (via the Signal Input / Output (SIO) panel), sends an alarm to the deluge control panel, and sends a signal to the solenoid that opens the automatic deluge valve. The deluge control panels have batteries that provide backup power to the panel if alternating current (AC) power is lost. The circuitry is supervised. A supervisory alarm is received at the FDC when AC or direct current (DC) power is lost. The demister screens remove much of the water from the air stream before it reaches the HEPA filters to protect the filtration capability of the filters. The manually activated deluge system is located immediately upstream of the frrst stage of HEPA filters. Deluge nozzles spray water directly onto the first stage of KEPA filters. The manual deluge system provides an important emergency capability if the frrst stage of HEPA filters is in danger of being consumed by fire. Activation of the system under such conditions, however, will likely result in the loss of the first stage, either due to plugging by soaked particulates (which will effectively stop ventilation), by partial plugging causing media failure, or by direct damage. Failure of the first stage other than by plugging will subject remaining downstream stages to the possibility of fire, heat, or physical damage. The hazard and accident analysis credits the filtered exhaust ventilation svsterns in Building 991 and 3uildina 985. The automztic pieiium deluge swteems are identified as defense-in-depth systems for the filtered exhaust vendlation svsterns but are not credited in the safetv analys&. The systems are to be maintained in their current configuration (i.e., not allowed to dewade an17 fhrther than is currently realized) as added assurance for motection of the HEPA Revision I Building 991 Complex FSAR September 1999 I
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,._I REVIEW AND APPROVAL FOR BUILDI
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i L- FACILITY OVERWEW The Building
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Based on the information in Table 1
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i ,: - DF 1 - DF 3 - DF 3 DFJ - DF
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AB AC ACI ALARA Am AOL ARCIE ASME B
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j ?,.- LCO L.L.C. LLW LSDW MAL MAR
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V Volt WAD Work Authorization Docum
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. 2.3.1 Fire Suppression. Detection
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Figure 2-2 Building 991 and Associa
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Chapter 6 Derivation of Technical S
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Table 1-1 DOE-STD-3009 and Building
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Page 36 and 37: 1.2.6.2 Safety Analysis Summary Pot
Page 38 and 39: polishing equipment. The Metallogra
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Page 42 and 43: specified in HSP 11.03 were met by
Page 44 and 45: USQD-991-98.0900-MIU (Ref. 20) was
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Page 58 and 59: Bearing walls and intermediate conc
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Page 72 and 73: Table 2-1 Fire Suppression Systems
Page 74 and 75: The sprinkler system consists of a
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Page 80 and 81: filters against the impacts of larg
Page 82 and 83: 2.3.2 Heating, Ventilation, and Air
Page 84 and 85: The S-1 system has outside air damp
Page 86 and 87: Supplv Zone 4 (S-4) The S-4 supply
Page 88 and 89: Table 2-2 Building 991 Complex Exha
Page 92 and 93: system contains an untested HEPA st
Page 94 and 95: The burners are Model LNR 8.4-G-20
Page 96 and 97: LSDW speakers are located throughou
Page 98 and 99: 2.3.5.2 Steam and Condensate System
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Page 108 and 109: the successful completion of a PSC'
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Page 124 and 125: *I L\ '. '/ CHAPTER 4 HAZARD AND AC
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pertinent to FSAR preparation, haza
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Facilities, DOE-HDBK-30 10-94 (Ref.
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PDC is the plume duration correctio
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0 Hazard Warning - The availability
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For hazardous materials that did no
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4.4.2 Hazard Classification The DOE
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scenarios. A total of 37 event tree
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Revision 1 Scpinnher 19% (2) extrem
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determined to represent a Standard
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The extremely unlikely impact of a
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750 Pad tank farm that migrates to
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4 3 M a p: X - a E 0 U N U
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4.6 RISK DOMINANT ACCIDENT SCENARIO
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A"" and Room 170 (including connect
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area, or the Building 996 waste sto
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consequence is low (0.084rem). If'
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! Movernent of waste containers fro
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The risk and conseauences of Punctu
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i ’ i, ! U” In summary, removal
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ch ch
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4.8 SAFETY ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS AND
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~ 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Revisi
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It Tip: 3 *-- Revision 1 September
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 6. DERIVATION OF T
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4 7 : i Maintenance of this Design
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NI -1 -4 Y) d
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6.4 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.4.1 I
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6.5 TSR DERIVATION The TSRs were de
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6.6 REFERENCES 1 Safety Analysis fo
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Revision 1 September 1999 CHAPTER 5
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 5. SAFETY STRUCTUR
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Conditions for Operations (LCOs) in
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EI .- .- 4 3 I
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5.2.2 SC-3 SSCS This section summar
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5.3 SSC SAFETY CATEGORY DESfGNATIUl
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APPENDIX A BUILDING 991 COMPLEX TEC
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5B.4.2 CREDITED PROGRAMMATIC ELEMEN
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TERM ' AFFECTED AREA BASISBASES BUI
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TERM OUT-OF-SERVICE OUT-OF-TOLERANC
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1.2 ACRONYMS AC AOL CSE DOE DOT FEV
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limits on container radioactive mat
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1.2 LOGICAL CONNECTORS (continued)
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2. SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMlTING CONTR
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LCO 3.0.7 LCO 3.0.8 LCO 3.0.9 LCO 3
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LCO 3.0.6 (cont.) Calibration that
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LCO 3.0.8 Planned OUT-OF-TOLERANCES
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3./4. LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERA
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3./4. LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERA
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BASES BACKGROUND The BUILDING 991 C
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BASES REQUIRED ACTION A. 1 LCO 3.1
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BASES ~ ~~~ ~ REQUIRED ACTION A.2 (
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BASES REQUIRED The four-hour COMPLE
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BASES REQUIRED ACTION C.2 (continue
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7 ;' LT 6, BASES REQUDRED ACTION D.
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BASES RE0UIKE.D ACTION E. 1 Revisio
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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ]BASES SR
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3.2 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATEO
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S LRkEIL LANCE REQLZEMEhT SR 4.2.1
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BASES BACKGROChD (continued) The Bu
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BASES BACGGROVhD (continued) APPLIC
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BASES APPLICA'TION TO SAFETY rzN At
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BASES REOUIRED ACTION A. I [continu
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BASES REO U1RE.D ACTION C 1 [contin
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BASES REQUIRED ACTION E. I REQUIRED
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?I 1i-l ~~ ~ ~ SR 4.2.1 The verific
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3J4. LIILlXTfNG CONDXTlUKS FOR OPER
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3.M. IJIR/EITXNG COLWXTIONS FOR OPE
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BASES BA4CKGRO'L'KD (continued) Rev
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BASES APPLICABILITY Jlis LCO is app
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BASES REO UIRED ACTIONB 1 The Build
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BASES REQUIRED ACTION B.2.2 {contin
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SK4 3.1 Thc verification of the com
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SURVEILLANCE RE 0 UIREMENTS 3A SE S
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, -I ,.i ’-, \ 5.0.3 AC Programma
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5.1 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 ORGANIZATION
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5.2 5.2.1 5.2.2 INVENTORY CONTROL A
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AOL 2 SNM containers staged in the
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AOL 4 The quantities of radioactive
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AOL 5 Wooden LLW crates stored at t
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AOL 7 All pallets of waste containe
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2 4’1 ACTIONS: CONDITION 1. ODmti
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5.3 CONTROL OF COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL
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ACTIONS: CONDITION 1. High heat rel
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AOL 10 A flammable gas use control
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5.4 5.4.1 5.4.2 5.4.3 Revision 1 Sc
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Revision 1 Szptcrnber 1999 Table 2
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5.6 5.6.1 Revision I Sntcrnher t999
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-I -)y 5.8.1 fieauirenients for Wor
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5B.0 GENERAL APPLICATION BASES Revi
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5B. 1 ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT B
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5B.2 INVENTORY CONTROL AND MATERIAL
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AOL 1 POC and waste containers are
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, 1 \,?i AOL 3 BASIS (cont'd) AOL 4
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AOL 5 This AQL applies to wooden LL
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AOL 7 BASIS (cont'd) AOL 8 BASIS: R
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AOL 8 BASIS [cont'dj Revision 1 Sep
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5B.3 CONTROL OF COMBUSTIBLE MATERIA
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-7 “q Y AOL 9 BASIS Combustible m
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5B.4 MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE O
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' I *r- ;:x 5B.5 EMERGENCY RESPONSE
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5B.S WORK COYTROL BASES 5B.S.l Requ
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6 DESIGN FEATURES The purpose of th
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7 REFERENCES A- 1 A-2 A-3 A4 A-5 A4
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k e- .. _. . .~,
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' Building 991 Complex FSAR/NSTR Ch
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1 Revisions NSTR-011-98. Safety Ana
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