gambling in alberta - Research Services - University of Lethbridge

Compromise or Facilitation of Regulatory Function?
Some people have speculated that another potential impact of the fact that the Alberta
government is now the largest provider and recipient of gambling revenue, is that it
compromises the provincial government’s traditional role as regulator of gambling and other
‘problematic products’ to ensure there are sufficient safeguards in place for the general public
(a role it still serves for the provision of alcohol, tobacco, and drugs; firearms; etc.).
Regulatory approaches to the legal provision of gambling around the world exist on a
continuum from a free market approach with the government only being involved through its
traditional role as regulator (e.g., United States, Australia), to the government being very much
involved in the actual provision of gambling or being the primary financial beneficiary of private
gambling operations (either through a state monopoly, or high tax rates on private operators).
In most jurisdictions, government control varies as a function of the type of gambling. The
most common situation is where the government establishes a monopoly for lotteries (present
in two-thirds of European jurisdictions, and common in North America). In several European
countries only a public operator or one closely supervised by the State can manage a casino
(Germany, Greece, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands, Sweden, Slovenia).
A conflict of interest obviously exists when the regulator (i.e., government) and the operator
are part of the same organization or the regulator is the primary financial beneficiary of
gambling. This conflict of interest potentially compromises the regulator’s ability to implement
truly effective prevention policies, and to effectively regulate the operator. Effective
prevention and treatment will typically negatively impact revenues, introducing a policy conflict
between the protection of public health and the maximization of gambling revenues (Adams,
Raeburn, & de Silva, 2009; Orford, 2009).
The actual effects of this conflict of interest are difficult to determine, as this situation tends to
be confounded with other things. Many of the jurisdictions where government is the provider
of gambling and/or receives most of the revenue (e.g., Canada, many European countries) are
involved in gambling ostensibly to provide it in a safer and more controlled fashion to the
public. With this greater concern for public welfare, these governments also tend to offer more
in the way of problem gambling prevention and treatment initiatives. That being said, a) the
creation of these initiatives is partly spurred on by their sensitivity to this conflict of interest
criticism, and b) the initiatives that most of these governments have chosen to implement have
tended to be the least effective ones (Williams, West & Simpson, 2007, 2008). 62 In contrast,
places where the government is primarily involved in the regulation rather than provision of
gambling (e.g. United States, Australia), tend to have less in the way of protective measures, as
these governments put more responsibility on the individual to govern their own behaviour.
The power of the gambling lobby/industry is also much stronger in these types of countries and
effectively deters the introduction of protective measures (Grinols, 2004).
62 Most of these initiatives have focused on the fairly weak strategy of better education of consumers as opposed
to more effective policy initiatives that constrain the availability of gambling and how it is provided.
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