gambling in alberta - Research Services - University of Lethbridge

There are also some important lessons from the alcohol field, where the evidence indicates that
monopolistic and/or government involvement in alcohol provision is associated with less harm
to the general public (e.g., Miller et al., 2006; Popova et al., 2011). However, this correlational
data is subject to the same confounds mentioned above. A stronger methodology involves
examining the effects of privatisation of alcohol provision in jurisdictions where government
monopolies previously existed. Privatization has occurred in several U.S. states (Idaho, Iowa,
Maine, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia), a couple of Canadian provinces (Quebec, Alberta),
and certain countries (New Zealand). 63 This research has generally found privatization to be
associated with an increase in the number of retail outlets, longer opening hours, and increases
in overall alcohol consumption (with overall consumption level having a statistical relationship
to overall level of harm) (Holder et al., 2008; Wagenaar & Holder, 1995, 1996; cf. Trolldal,
2005).
Hence, although somewhat counterintuitive, the limited evidence tends to indicate that
government involvement in the provision of gambling may actually be preferable to noninvolvement
in terms of providing a ‘safer’ product. 64 To be clear, however, the issue of
government versus private delivery of gambling is a complex one and the present discussion
does not speak to the potential overall benefits of private versus government provision (i.e., in
some circumstances private delivery may produce greater economic benefits and/or a better
consumer product).
63 Although in some of these cases it just involved elimination of certain types of alcohol provision (e.g., retail wine
monopoly), and in some cases there were still restrictions on private retail (e.g., no provision in grocery stores).
64 This does not negate the fact that a conflict of interest still exists and most governments (to date) have
implemented fairly ineffectual methods of preventing problem gambling. Recognizing this, some jurisdictions have
enacted legislation that targets this conflict of interest and/or requires gambling providers (government or
otherwise) to effectively mitigate the harm from the provision of gambling. This has been done to some extent in
Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Germany has legislation that among other things a) prohibits the pay
of gambling provider executives to be tied to gambling revenue; b) requires that the monitoring of compliance
with gambling regulations be done by authorities not connected to the fiscal interests of the state; c) requires all
new gambling products to be reviewed by an advisory board of gambling addiction experts prior to their
introduction; d) requires gambling providers to detect and exclude problem gamblers from gambling venues
(Meyer, Hayer & Griffiths, 2009). The Netherlands prohibits gambling providers from making a personal profit. All
games are either for ‘good causes’ or taxes; the one exception is slot machines outside of casinos.
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