North Korean House of Cards

ase of power. 261 Decision-making on all policies and personnel appointments was
transferred to the Party Secretariat Office and specialized departments, while the
Politburo was reduced to a rubber stamp for ratification. 262 It was within this
transition period, as Kim Jong-il began to assume more responsibility for running
the regime, that an additional system of command and control began to develop
attached to the offices of the heir apparent. Of particular importance was the
development of a Personal Secretariat and an apparatus for managing the Kim family
finances, otherwise known as the Royal Economy, both of which will be discussed
in more detail in the following chapters.
Kim Jong-il Reorients the System
It is one thing to consolidate one’s power as heir apparent in North Korea’s
“Leader-dominant system” (Suryong-je). It is quite another thing to hold onto that
power as the succession moves into its final phase. The heir has to assume more
case of Kim Jong-il, the final phase of the succession began in the early 1990s. During
this phase, the regime transformed its operating procedures to prepare for the
transfer of power and Kim Jong-il’s ruling power began to eclipse that of Kim Il-sung.
Kim Jong-il’s situational awareness was further enhanced as he took control of the
day-to-day affairs of the regime. While Kim Jong-il maintained Kim Il-sung’s
policies, he began to leave his own mark. These aspects of the succession were, for the
most part, contained within the Party apparatus.
However, in order for the transfer of power to take place, Kim Jong-il
needed to assert his control over the military. This could only be done by revising
the North Korean political regime. The Suryong would no longer rule through
the Party. 263 Now he would take a more direct role in ruling the government and
261 Lee Yang-Su et al., “Analysis of the DPRK Power Group (2)—Route to the Heart of Leadership,”
Korea JoongAng Daily, January 5, 2007. In 1994, twenty-nine out of fifty North Korean elites
had worked for the KWP Politburo. This means that this body was an important stop on the road to
advancement. In 2006, however, only eight members of the elite had served in the Politburo. As a South
Korean intelligence official explained, “Since 1993, Chairman Kim has not reorganized the Politburo,
which has a lot of empty positions due to deaths, purges, and defections. Furthermore, the Politburo itself
is being overshadowed by the Secretariat.”
262 Toward the end of the Kim Il-sung period, policy consultation within formal leadership circles
became perfunctory. This was replaced by a reporting mechanism whereby policy drafts were drawn up
by each ministry and department before being passed directly to Kim Jong-il’s office. Here, they were
prioritized and, if deemed worthy, passed to Kim Il-sung. The Political Bureau was convened only to ratify
decisions that had already been made by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.
263 A number of epithets denoting Kim Jong-il’s elite status began to appear in the months after
his formal designation as heir apparent. North Korean media labeled him “Dear Leader” (Chin-ae-haneun
ji-do-ja) in November 1980, an apparent analog to his father’s “Great Leader” (Wi-dae-han Suryong).
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
124