North Korean House of Cards

If Kim Jong-un was behind his uncle’s purge, it suggests that his political
skills have developed to the point that he may be able to run the regime on his own,
most likely through the “hub-and-spoke” leadership style of his father. At the very
least, he was able to successfully eliminate his uncle, who was believed to be the
second most powerful individual in the regime, without throwing the entire regime
into chaos. At present, the wider leadership appears frozen in place, which bodes
well for near-term stability. If Kim Jong-un has assumed the role of the Control
Tower within the regime, the long-term prognosis of stability will still depend on his
ability to rule effectively.
However, if Jang Song-taek’s purge was the result of a power struggle that
forced Kim Jong-un to act, the implications for near-term stability are much less
certain. If Jang could be brought down without the Supreme Leader’s direct involvement,
this suggests that a coalition of powerful forces had been forged, possibly
without Kim’s full knowledge. Some have suggested that the purge was the result
of a natural coalescing of forces of the KWP OGD, military, and internal security
apparatus. If this is true, these influential institutions have agendas that Kim would
have to pay attention to, if not follow. The existence of several centers of power
would impair near-term stability now that the unifying force, Jang Song-taek, has
been removed. Kim Jong-un’s ability to keep these powerful forces in check will be
critical for regime cohesion in the future.
This book has argued that the answer to Jang’s purge likely lies in a decision
largely driven by the Kim family. Jang Song-taek had become a liability. He could
not be trusted to uphold the best interests of the Kim family above all else. However,
power struggles at the second echelon of power between Jang and other powerful
interests groups undoubtedly accelerated his downfall and may have even contributed
to his final fate.
The story behind Jang’s purge still remains unclear. Possible motives,
potential oversteps, and miscalculations figure prominently in any discussion of the
decision-making process leading up to December 12, 2013. What also remains a
source of contention among Pyongyang-watchers is the nature and stability of the
regime under Kim Jong-un. Some see tentative steps, especially in the economic
realm, toward reform and away from how the regime has been ruled in the past.
They point to Kim Jong-un’s unprecedented promise of “no more belt tightening”
in his April 15, 2012 speech. They talk about the “May 30 Measures” issued by
the Cabinet in 2014. They argue that the ongoing diplomatic charm offensive is
evidence of a regime desperate to reach out to the international community for its
long-term survival.
Ken E. Gause
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