North Korean House of Cards

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Pyong-so, another First Vice Director of the KWP OGD, was promoted to the rank of vice marshal. 535 This raised speculation that he might replace Choe Ryong-hae, whose public profile as the top political officer in the armed forces had been waning. In May 2014, this speculation was proven true as Hwang was appointed Director of the GPB. 536 Four months later, Hwang replaced Choe Ryong-hae as Vice Chairman of the NDC, a post he had assumed in April 2014. Over the course of his dramatic rise, Hwang surpassed Choe in the formal ranking, becoming the de facto number-two man in the regime. For many Pyongyang-watchers, this confirmed that the OGD was on the rise and that its influence was spreading throughout the regime. This speculation was further supported by an examination of the North Korean leadership, which shows that a fraternity of current and past OGD vice directors now holds key positions throughout the regime. A study by South Korean media shows that at the very senior levels of power, both in Pyongyang and in the provinces, the KWP OGD bolsters its institutional ties through command and control responsibilities. Some of these positions, such as Hwang Pyong-so’s position as head of the GPB, are held by current members of the OGD. In addition, many more positions are held by former OGD members. It is speculated that the bond between these individuals remains strong, given the OGD has enhanced influence throughout the regime. The table below includes individuals with current and past ties to the OGD. Table 9: Regime Members with Ties to the OGD Name Post Relationship to the OGD Kim Kyong-ok CMC Member First Vice Director, OGD 537 Hwang Pyong-so GPB Director, Vice Chairman, First Vice Director, OGD 538 NDC Jo Yon-jun Politburo Alternate Member First Vice Director, OGD Kim In-kol Vice Director, OGD 535 “Decision on Conferring Title of Vice Marshal of Korean People’s Army on Hwang Pyong-so,” KCNA, April 28, 2014. 536 “May Day Banquet for Workers Given,” KCNA, May 1, 2014. At this event, Hwang was identified as the Director of the KPA GPB. 537 According to recent rumors in the summer of 2015, Kim Kyong-ok may have retired from his official posts for “health reasons.” “How Kim Jong Un Gets Rid Of Threats To His Power,” The Chosun Ilbo, May 18, 2015. 538 There is debate within the Pyongyang-watching community over whether Hwang remains a First Vice Director of the OGD since assuming his post in the GPB. Ken E. Gause 239
Name Post Relationship to the OGD Min Pyong-chol Vice Director, OGD Ri Su-yong Minister of Foreign Affairs Former official in the OGD Kim Pyong-hae Jong Myong-hak Politburo Member, KWP Secretary for Cadre Affairs First Vice Chairman, KWP Inspection Committee Former official in the OGD Former official in the OGD Ri Jae-il First Vice Director, KWP PAD Former official in the OGD Choe-hwi First Vice Director, KWP PAD Former official in the OGD Kang Pil-hun Director of the Political Department, MPS Former official in the OGD Jang Pyong-kyu Prosecutor General Former official in the OGD Pak Tae-song Ri Man-kon Ri Son-won Pak Jong-nam Chief Secretary, South Pyongan Provincial Party Committee Chief Secretary, North Pyongan Provincial Party Committee Chief Secretary, Ryanggang Provincial Party Committee Chief Secretary, Gangwon Provincial Party Committee Former Vice Director, KWP OGD 539 Former Vice Director, KWP OGD Former Vice Director, KWP OGD Former Vice Director, KWP OGD 540 The enhanced influence of the OGD was tied not only to its apparent hegemony throughout the leadership system, but also to its evolving relationship with the Kim family. Reports centered on the vacuum left behind by Kim Kyong-hui’s decision to remove herself from politics. Both Kim Yo-jong and Kim Sol-song, who were tied to the OGD, were seen by Pyongyang-watchers and senior defectors as increasing their power and responsibility to fill this vacuum. 541 Kim Yo-jong’s ties to the OGD have been largely institutional. She has been identified as both a vice 539 According to one defector, he also has ties to Kim Jong-un’s Personal Secretariat. 540 Yun Wan-Jun, “KWP OGD Making a Clean Sweep of Key Posts in the Party, Military, and Provinces…Even Leading South Korea Policy in Reality,” Dong-A Ilbo, June 26, 2014. 541 Author’s interviews in Seoul, 2014. According to one senior defector interviewed by the author, the KWP OGD is not a homogenous body with a unified point of view and sense of loyalty. In fact, it is made up of at least two groups tied to the Kim family. Many of the OGD officials tied to Kim Jong-un’s Personal Secretariat (Kim Kyong-ok, Pak Tae-song, Ri Su-yong, Seo Sang-gi, and Kim Su-yong) have long-standing ties to Kim Sol-song. On the other hand, officials such as Hwang Pyong-so, Jo Yonjun, and Min Pyong-chul are much closer to Kim Jong-un. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea 240
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North Korean House of Cards Leaders
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Copyright © 2015 Committee for Hum
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Jack David Senior Fellow, Hudson In
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3. The Regent Structure............
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d. Ministry of People’s Security.
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II. PREFACE After his seminal 2012
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the reader that many are purged bec
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IV. ABOUT THIS STUDY There are nume
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VI. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Merriam-Webst
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ultimate decision maker and sole so
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humanity; in order to understand cr
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32. NIS: South Korean National Inte
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egent structure would begin to chan
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However, there is very little evide
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IX. SECTION ONE: NORTH KOREAN LEADE
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All Party members, military men, an
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Dressed in black, gloveless, and ba
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choreography of the transfer of pow
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suffered a stroke. 18, 19 A month l
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the GPB in the Kim Jong-il era, beg
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2009 from Chief of the GSD to Comma
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posting, Ri had been the Fifth Corp
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Days after Jang Jong-nam was identi
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4. Civil-Military Relations by Mid-
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above, especially the purge of Ri Y
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leaders include Choe Ryong-hae, Kim
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of the military. More than that of
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B. CHAPTER TWO: THE PURGE OF JANG S
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afforded Jang the opportunity to me
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and merged into the RGB as Bureaus
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to as the éminence grise, who was
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a. Kim Jong-il’s Will In 2012, de
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A second rumor suggests that Jang
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KWP OGD, and the SSD, to construct
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ut his pleas went unanswered. At th
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eferred to him as an “unparallele
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out of the picture, 163 the connect
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ankings in October 2013 and then fe
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Jong-il, such as Ri Su-yong (Ri Cho
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ones, lowering the average age of t
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the regime. Throughout 2013, Choe a
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4. Kim Jong-un and the Wider Leader
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Armed Forces, 202 had been executed
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Name Position(s) Comments Kim Solso
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Name Position(s) Comments Kim Songn
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Name Position(s) Comments Colonel G
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Table 2: Second Echelon of Power Na
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Name Position(s) Comments Miltary/
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Name Position(s) Comments General K
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Table 3: Third Echelon of Power Nam
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Name Position(s) Comments Ju Kyucha
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Name Position(s) Comments General P
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Name Position(s) Comments Colonel G
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Name Position(s) Comments Ro Tu-cho
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Table 4: Fourth Echelon of Power Na
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Name Position Comments Lieutenant G
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Name Position Comments Lieutenant G
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Name Position Comments Hong Yongchi
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Name Position Comments Jo Thae-san
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Name Position Comments Government R
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Name Position Comments Kim Choljin
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Name Relation Comments Ri Il-hyok K
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Name Relation Comments Cha Cholma S
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While there is debate within the co
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• The Royal Economy. This chapter
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within the leadership in the mid-19
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ase of power. 261 Decision-making o
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The Tenth SPA convened in Pyongyang
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system of socialism.” 273 For man
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Leader. However, this will not last
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Image 11: Kim Jong-il’s signature
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Image 13: National Security meeting
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Image 15: A March 13, 2013 military
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. Kim Jong-un’s Role as Decision
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The Friday meetings focus on milita
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and its Presidium organize and dire
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KWP Charter, the CMC “discusses a
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worldview. 312 He would hone these
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constraints established by his fath
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Fully assuming the role of Supreme
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As the guidance in Kim Jong-il’s
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1. The Personal Secretariat under K
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of Kim’s death in 2011, it is rum
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Kim Jong-il Secretariat was not an
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and manner of operation, however, a
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a. Personal Secretariat Personnel a
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In 2013, South Korean media reports
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Supreme Command apparatus to the GS
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. Secretarial Office of the Central
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from the field commands, as well as
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administrative. Kim Jong-il, a more
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overseeing the implementation of th
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C. CHAPTER SIX: THE ROYAL ECONOMY
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for Kim Il-sung’s own consolidati
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Following the creation of Office 39
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The Early European Connection In th
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numerous subordinate trade and fore
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According to a former diplomat who
Page 197 and 198: National Intelligence Service (NIS)
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Page 211 and 212: Jang’s Channel to China The Korea
Page 213 and 214: Chart 10: Jang’s Channel into the
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Page 221 and 222: • The KWP Administrative Departme
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Page 225 and 226: Chart 12: Jang’s Tapping into Mil
Page 227 and 228: In addition to these reforms, Kim J
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Page 231 and 232: Night of the Long Knives. Saddam Hu
Page 233 and 234: In the months following the Party c
Page 235 and 236: According to South Korean sources,
Page 237 and 238: In April 2012, the regime made a nu
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Page 251 and 252: Star.” 545 His elevation in North
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Page 257 and 258: i. Structure The headquarters of th
Page 259 and 260: Chart 18: Organizational Chart of t
Page 261 and 262: Pyongyang Anti-Aircraft Artillery C
Page 263 and 264: Palace of the Sun, which holds the
Page 265 and 266: ii. Cordon of Security: Relationshi
Page 267 and 268: iii. Role in the Regime It is assum
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Page 271 and 272: • The Eighth Bureau (Border Secur
Page 275 and 276: d. Ministry of People’s Security
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Page 285 and 286: offices: the Cadre Department, the
Page 287 and 288: Jo Kyong-chol seated at the far lef
Page 289 and 290: XI. CONCLUSION To commemorate the 1
Page 291 and 292: Others see a ruthless regime that i
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Page 295 and 296: continues to create the image of a
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• General Ri Yong-gil (60) has be
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2. Party • Kang Sok-ju (76) has b
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• Kim Song-nam (62) is an alterna
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domestic and social issues .668 He
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may occasionally be able to reach o
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Committee list.At the Third Session
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1970s, 692 but his career was resur
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Vice Chairman of the NDC, O Kuk-ryo
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of communication to Kim Jong-un lik
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• Ju Kyu-chang (87) has been an a
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General Pak as his successor withou
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as the “Storm Corps.” He first
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present for Kim Jong-un’s guidanc
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senior leadership are evident in hi
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on debt settlement issues with Russ
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Date Visit Gift (as described in No
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Date Visit Gift (as described in No
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XIV. APPENDIX C: NORTH KOREAN MILIT
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Insignia Title/Name 소좌 (So-jwa)
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B. KOREAN PEOPLE’S ARMY NAVAL FOR
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Insignia Title/Name 상위 (Sang-wi
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C. KOREAN PEOPLE’S ARMY AIR FORCE
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Insignia Title/Name 상위 (Sang-wi
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XV. BIBLIOGRAPHY A. Books and Journ
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54. Cathcart, Adam. “Thrice-Curse
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117. “Is Kim Jong Un Playing Musi
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191. Lee, Gyo-Gwan. “Kim Jong-il
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264. “North Korea’s Kim Jong-un
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Committee for Human Rights in North
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North Korean House of Cards

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