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North Korean House of Cards

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activities, and situation materials. 377 Kim’s Personal Secretariat prioritized the reports<br />

and submitted them for his comment and approval. 378<br />

According to elite defector accounts, Kim Jong-il used a series <strong>of</strong> formulaic<br />

handwritten notations to convey his approval or disapproval <strong>of</strong> proposals and<br />

reports. There were three main categories:<br />

• Signed instructions (chin-pil ji-si) included a signature, a date, and<br />

occasionally a written opinion. Such a document was referred to as<br />

a handwritten instruction. By signing and dating the document, the<br />

Leader signified that the contents <strong>of</strong> report documents should be<br />

regarded as his intentions and instructions to be implemented as<br />

written. The Leader would personally take responsibility for their<br />

results. Such documents carried the weight <strong>of</strong> verbal instructions and<br />

were implemented unconditionally.<br />

• Signed documents (chin-pil mun-geon) included the date <strong>of</strong> review<br />

without Kim’s signature or comment. Such a document was referred<br />

to as a handwritten document. By merely dating the document, the<br />

Leader signified that he agreed with the contents <strong>of</strong> the report but<br />

would not be responsible for the results. However, like a handwritten<br />

instruction, it was considered sanctioned policy and must be implemented<br />

to the letter. 379<br />

• Documents returned unsigned or dated signified that the Leader<br />

either did not agree with or did not understand the document report.<br />

It also probably meant that the counselor and his chain <strong>of</strong> command<br />

did not accurately judge the Leader’s intentions, something that likely<br />

resulted in criticism and punishment. 380<br />

Once a document was ratified by Kim it became policy. Upon receipt <strong>of</strong> the<br />

policy guidance from Kim’s Personal Secretariat, the originating institution <strong>of</strong> the<br />

document report was responsible for its implementation. The person charged with<br />

377 Hyon Song-il, <strong>North</strong> Korea’s National Strategy and Power Elite, op. cit. These reports are<br />

registered at the KWP’s Confidential Documents Bureau after the final approval <strong>of</strong> the department or<br />

ministry’s leadership is received. They were then sent to Kim Jong-il’s Personal Secretariat, where they<br />

were prepared for his approval.<br />

378 Ibid. Kim Jong-il’s Personal Secretariat was not authorized to reject any document without<br />

first receiving his approval.<br />

379 Ibid. A distinction was made between a handwritten instruction and a handwritten document<br />

in the early 1990s as the volume <strong>of</strong> guidance from Kim Jong-il’s <strong>of</strong>fice increased dramatically, leading to<br />

careless interpretation during the implementation process.<br />

380 Ibid.<br />

Ken E. Gause<br />

173

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