North Korean House of Cards

it remains to be seen whether this is a system that is capable of making dynamic
adjustments to changing economic and social challenges and realities. The Royal
Economy is facing an uphill battle. Because of the measures taken by the international
community, hard currency operations, both illicit and legal, are filling the
Kim family coffers at a much slower rate than in the past. At the same time, Kim
Jong-un, because of the inherent challenges he faces as a young third-generation
leader, has to expend more funds to retain and build loyalty across the regime. His
major construction enterprises, including theme parks, ski resorts, and upgrades to
Pyongyang’s infrastructure have cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Additionally,
the Royal Economy has been drawn on to continue research and development of
North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction. At some point, the funding brought
in by the Royal Economy will fall too far behind the threshold Kim Jong-un needs
to freely run the regime. If he has not consolidated his power by then, his position
within the regime could become vulnerable.
Even more important than the Royal Economy to Kim Jong-un’s near-term
survival is the internal security apparatus. Jang’s purge has brought this apparatus
under Kim’s control, but its loyalty is still somewhat in question. Many of the key
leaders throughout the apparatus once belonged to Kim Jong-il’s and Kim Kyonghui’s
patronage networks. This is certainly true of Kim Won-hong, Director of the
SSD, Choe Pu-il, Minister of People’s Security, and Yun Jong-rin, Commander of
the GC. Kim Jong-un appears to be moving very carefully in securing his hold on
these institutions. He has apparently fostered competition between them, perhaps
emulating his father’s strategy in the 1990s. As a result, the MSC has once again risen
in stature, while the SSD and KWP OGD have grown in power with the purge of
their mutual enemy, Jang Song-taek. Kim Jong-un’s ability to control the internal
security apparatus in the long term will depend on his ability to satisfy their appetite
for hard currency while controlling their inclination toward destructive competition.
This will be difficult since many of the more lucrative, independent hard currency
operations inside the regime are run by family members tied to the internal
security apparatus.
Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un’s Personal Secretariat is growing to suit his newly
expanded powers as the Control Tower. Many of the functionaries are younger
cadres from the fourth generation of leaders. However, a critical component of this
personal apparatus, the SOCC, is reportedly still populated with members of Kim
Jong-il’s Personal Secretariat. Many of these individuals are critical for running the
day-to-day operations of the regime and are also important for the Supreme Leader’s
situational awareness. Until this part of the apparatus has been thoroughly revamped
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
284