North Korean House of Cards

Leader. However, this will not last. If Kim Jong-un is unable to succeed in the policy
paths he has established, especially those tied to the “Dual Development Strategy”
(Byeong-jin), natural rivalries within the regime could re-emerge. If Kim is unable to
manage these power struggles, his position as Suryong could become vulnerable. 279
A collective leadership composed of elements of Kim’s retinue is hard to
envision. Not only would this faction have to lead through Kim for its policies to have
legitimacy, but they would also be vulnerable to the Supreme Leader’s whim. The
surveillance system in place reports directly to the Supreme Leader from a number
of different channels, making the formation of any faction nearly impossible. 280 For
Kim Jong-un to fully achieve his role as Supreme Leader, he will need to be able
to manipulate his retinue as well as the wider leadership. Kim Jong-un’s advisors
are invested with key portfolios across the policy spectrum. They have the latitude
and influence to operate within the policy environment, but not as much as was
enjoyed by the regents. It is Kim’s job to balance these divergent interests through
the acceptance or rejection of recommendations.
3. The Decision-Making Process
One of the central questions regarding the Kim Jong-un regime is how
decisions are made. The process appears to have changed from Kim Il-sung to Kim
Jong-il, and presumably has changed again under Kim Jong-un. It is a process that
is impacted by how the Supreme Leader utilizes the wider leadership environment,
as well as by his leadership style. After a year in power, the growing consensus among
Pyongyang-watchers was that Kim Jong-un is the final decision maker. However, there
was fierce debate over how the decision-making process functioned. Does Kim
Jong-un control the decision-making environment and determine the agenda, as is
preme Leader, and may even try to undermine their rivals, but they appear to now refrain from the fierce
power struggles that characterized the period before Jang Song-taek was purged.
279 Author’s interviews in Seoul, May 2014. According to numerous Pyongyang-watchers in
South Korea, Kim Jong-un must consolidate his power over the next couple of years. Policy failures
stretching into the two to five year timeframe could be detrimental to the regime.
280 “Kim Jong-un: North Korea’s Supreme Leader or State Puppet?” op. cit. Michael Madden, the
author of North Korea Leadership Watch, observes that Kim Jong-un inherited a hyper-vigilant system put
in place as Kim Jong-il’s health was declining. During this period, Kim Jong-il strengthened the Supreme
Leader’s lines of communication with the surveillance apparatus and Praetorian Guard. These channels
are not easily co-opted by Kim Jong-un’s retinue and some channels are designed to keep others under observation.
According to some sources inside Pyongyang, this includes multiple channels within the KWP
OGD, which allows this organization to conduct internal surveillance.
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
130