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North Korean House of Cards

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The Early European Connection<br />

In the 1970s and 1980s, a large part <strong>of</strong> the Kim family’s slush fund<br />

was tied to Europe. The Ambassador to Sweden Kil Chae-kyong, a<br />

Third Floor operative and reputed personal secretary in charge <strong>of</strong><br />

Kim Jong-il’s personal funds, oversaw the operations <strong>of</strong> the major<br />

<strong>North</strong> <strong>Korean</strong> embassies <strong>of</strong> Europe. He also handled procurements<br />

for the Kim family, including automobiles, liquor, cigarettes,<br />

electrical appliances, and so on without paying customs duties by<br />

exercising diplomatic privilege. Diplomats would secretly sell the<br />

goods to private companies in the countries where they were posted,<br />

regularly earning large amounts <strong>of</strong> foreign currency. They stashed<br />

these funds in the Foreign Ministry’s “loyalty funds” account in a<br />

bank in Bern, Switzerland.<br />

These secret money-making operations were referred to as the<br />

“movement to earn foreign currency for ensuring loyalty.” It began in<br />

the early 1980s at the prompting <strong>of</strong> Kim Jong-il. At first, then Foreign<br />

Minister Huh Dam, a confidante to Kim Il-sung, had overall responsibility<br />

for the operations. However, as power passed to Kim Jong-il<br />

in the latter half <strong>of</strong> the 1980s, Ri Chol, a member <strong>of</strong> Kim Jong-il’s<br />

inner circle and future <strong>North</strong> <strong>Korean</strong> Ambassador to Switzerland,<br />

took over that role. In 1998, Kil Chae-kyong was arrested by Russian<br />

police for trying to sell $30,000 in counterfeit U.S. currency. 395<br />

At its inception, Office 38 was dedicated to creating a hub for securing<br />

South <strong>Korean</strong> aid and investment into <strong>North</strong> Korea. Previously, South <strong>Korean</strong><br />

funds had come into <strong>North</strong> Korea through a variety <strong>of</strong> channels controlled by a<br />

number <strong>of</strong> state and Party entities. Some <strong>of</strong> these supply channels belonged to<br />

Office 39 through the Finance and Supply Department (FSD). Others were tied<br />

to Kim Il-sung’s Presidential Supply Department, as well as the Party apparatus<br />

and state bodies.<br />

This created a problem for Kim Jong-il. First, his ability to account for<br />

these funds and tap into them for his personal use was complicated by many<br />

competing interests within the leadership. Second, and more importantly, hard<br />

395 “Tracing the Whereabouts <strong>of</strong> Kim Jong-il’s ‘Secret Funds’ –Kim Jong-un Inherits Huge Amount<br />

<strong>of</strong> Money Together with the Transfer <strong>of</strong> Power,” Bessatsu Takarajima, Issue No. 1984 (April 25, 2013).<br />

Committee for Human Rights in <strong>North</strong> Korea<br />

182

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