North Korean House of Cards

1973. In 1995, Chon became the First Vice President of the Daeseong
Economic Group, one of the corporations linked to Office 39. Three
years later, he moved into the Office 39 apparatus as a Deputy Director.
Chon’s ties to Kim Jong-un are less clear, as he has been a sporadic
presence on guidance inspections. However, his ties to hard currency
operations would suggest that he has a direct channel of communication
with Kim Jong-un, as well as Kim Yo-jong and Kim Sol-song, who
have responsibilities for the Kim family funds. His leadership ranking
rose from 41st on Kim Kuk-tae’s Funeral Committee list to 35th on Jon
Pyong-ho’s Funeral Committee list.
3. Government
• Pak Pong-ju (76) has been a member of the Politburo since 2013. After
being removed as Premier in 2007, following a shift in policy away from
the so-called “July 1 Measure” to improve the economy, 667 he re-emerged
in 2012 when he was appointed Director of the KWP Light Industry
Department (LID) at the Fourth Party Conference. During this period,
he was closely tied to Kim Kyong-hui, who gave up the Light Industry
position to become KWP Secretary. At the Central Committee Plenum
in March 2013 and the SPA in April 2013, Pak moved into the formal
leadership of the Party and was re-established as Premier. This was a clear
signal to many Pyongyang-watchers that North Korea will, at some point,
attempt to resurrect the June Measures from 2012 or even re-embark on
the more aggressive economic measures of the early 2000s. Since Jang
Song-taek’s execution, Pak now most likely interacts directly with Kim
Jong-un. According to one defector, Pak has assumed the responsibility
from Choe Yong-rim for organizing Kim Jong-un’s Tuesday meetings on
667 Ken E. Gause, North Korea Under Kim Chong-il: Power, Politics, and Prospects for Change, op.
cit. The July 2002 market liberalization reforms undertaken by North Korea were generally associated
with four measures. The first was a basic monetization of the economy. The government abolished the
coupon system for food rations and relaxed price controls, thereby allowing supply and demand to
determine prices. Second, the government abandoned the artificially high value of the North Korean won
(KPW), depreciating it from 2.2 KPW: 1 USD to 150 KPW: 1 USD. Third, the government decentralized
economic decisions. Fourth, the government pressed forward with special administrative and industrial
zones to attract foreign investment. By 2005, political support for these measures began to wane and
Pak Pong-ju was replaced at the SPA in 2007, allegedly after tensions with the military over his economic
reform plans.
Ken E. Gause
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