North Korean House of Cards

control the various agencies focused around the “Control Tower.” 115 The absence of
a strong central “Control Tower” could thus become, as one Pyongyang-watcher
noted, “the greatest source of uncertainty as the Kim Jong-un regime ventures into
the unknown without a manual.” 116
In 2012, many Pyongyang-watchers believed that with Kim Jong-il’s death,
the “Control Tower” role did not pass to Kim Jong-un, but to Jang Song-taek. 117 This
would not be surprising given the role Jang played in the months after Kim Jong-il’s
stroke in 2008, when he worked with Kim Kyong-hui and Kim Ok to assume
much of the “Control Tower” responsibilities. According to one source, Jang’s role
during this period was to receive orders from Kim Jong-il and channel them to state
agencies, 118 acting like a stand-in coordinator for day-to-day state affairs. This ensured
that if Kim died, the notion of the “Control Tower” would not collapse. In addition,
economic cooperation with China was a critical factor in stabilizing the regime
during the transfer of power. Since Jang already managed relations with China, this
was a logical addition to the “Control Tower” responsibilities.
In the first few years after Kim’s death, the North Korean media’s treatment of
Jang Song-taek was unique and, in many respects, unprecedented. In November 2012,
an enlarged meeting of the Politburo established the State Physical Culture and Sports
Guidance Committee (SPCSGC), a thirty-two-member organization responsible
for managing sports and athletics in North Korea. 119 Jang Song-taek was appointed
Chairman of the Committee. While North Korean media described the mission of
the new Committee as, “to control the overall sports work of the country in a unified
manner,” an examination of its membership revealed the most senior leadership in
the Party, Cabinet, and military. Moreover, some Pyongyang-watchers suggested that
it was a shadow government that allowed Jang to convene official meetings of senior
leaders without being accused of trying to undermine the legitimacy of Kim Jong-un,
who was not a member.
Several months later, Jang Song-taek’s position within the regime began to
be heralded in the popular media as second only to Kim Jong-un. 120 He was referred
115 With the intensifying competition to display loyalty among the elites, Kim Jong-un may not
be able to restrain them from engaging in destabilizing power struggles.
116 Choi Jin-Wook, “The Dawn of the Kim Jong Eun Regime and the Choice for North Korea,”
Korea Institute for National Unification: Online Series 12, No. 17 (May 15, 2012).
117 Author’s interviews in Seoul, April 2013.
118 “DPRK Leader’s In-Law Gaining Power,” AFP, November 11, 2008.
119 “Report on Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central
Committee,” KCBS, November 4, 2012.
120 This view was generally not reflected in the discourse within the Pyongyang-watching
community, which viewed Kim Jong-un as the undisputed leader. The notion of a number two leader was
for the most part reserved to discussions on leadership ranking, not power.
Ken E. Gause
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