North Korean House of Cards

3. The Future of the Internal Security Apparatus
In 2015, the North Korean regime finds itself faced with many threats to
internal stability. Kim Jong-un moves along the path of power consolidation, having
frozen the leadership in place with the purge and execution of his uncle, Jang
Song-taek, and other senior leaders, such as Hyon Yong-chol. In a hedging strategy
against the potential thaw in this freeze, he has bolstered the internal security
apparatus, placing increased power in the hands of the KWP OGD and the SSD.
The MSC also appears to have grown in influence, while the GC and MPS have
reportedly suffered setbacks, as reflected in the public profiles of their leadership.
Regardless of the politics of the moment, all of these organizations continue to play
a vital role in ensuring the regime’s control over society, as well as the protection of
the Supreme Leader himself. And, more importantly, any suggestion that these organizations
have become independent sources of power separate from the Supreme
Leader seems to be a flawed representation of the dynamics currently in play inside
the North Korean regime.
Looking towards the future, many North Korea-watchers have already
begun to speculate about the eventual collapse of the Hermit Kingdom. How could
it continue to defy gravity? The Soviet Union has collapsed and Mao’s China has
evolved. The Kim family dynasty surely cannot continue living in the dark ages,
refusing to join the community of nations—or can it?
For sixty years, the internal security apparatus has ensured the survival of the
Kim family dictatorship. Whether North Korea collapses, evolves, or continues to
muddle through will depend greatly on the viability of this all-pervasive apparatus.
In recent years, rumors have begun to seep out through the defector community that
cracks may have begun to appear in this repressive system. Security personnel are
becoming more susceptible to bribes, discipline among provincial level police is
waning, and even the public is taking retribution against members of the police force.
That said, there are no obvious indications that the security apparatus has broken
ranks with the raison d’être of the North Korean regime—protection of the center
(i.e., the Supreme Leader) from all threats foreign and domestic. Whether erosion
through corruption will eventually take a political toll on the regime’s ability to
control the population is a question for the future. But for now, scholars and intelligence
analysts can only observe and attempt to piece together the puzzle all the while
sure of only one thing: as long as the regime continues to adhere to the tactics of a
police state, to hold onto power, human rights will continue to be violated in North
Korea as the unfortunate citizens of the country continue to live in the shadows.
Ken E. Gause
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