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North Korean House of Cards

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The MSC continues to be one <strong>of</strong> the most secretive parts <strong>of</strong> the internal<br />

security apparatus. However, Jo’s rise in stature suggests that it is rising in<br />

power. The fact that Jo was one <strong>of</strong> the first cadres to accompany Kim Jong-un after<br />

his return to the public eye following a reported foot surgery in October 2014<br />

reinforces the notion that the Supreme Leader sees the MSC as a critical support<br />

mechanism in periods <strong>of</strong> uncertainty within the regime. Jo Kyong-chol was<br />

promoted to colonel general in February 2015. 549<br />

iv. The Guard Command’s Leadership Becomes Unclear<br />

Yun Jong-rin’s pr<strong>of</strong>ile rapidly declined in the months following Jang Songtaek’s<br />

execution. He appeared at the Central Memorial Meeting for Kim Jong-il<br />

on December 17, 2013. Two weeks later, he again appeared on the rostrum <strong>of</strong> a<br />

report meeting on Kim Jong-un’s Supreme Commandership. Then, he disappeared<br />

until April 2014, when he turned up as part <strong>of</strong> a group <strong>of</strong> leaders accompanying<br />

Kim Jong-un to a women’s soccer match. He disappeared again and reappeared in<br />

December 2014 as part <strong>of</strong> Kim Jong-un’s guidance inspection <strong>of</strong> Unit 963, although<br />

he had been demoted to a colonel general.<br />

v. Pr<strong>of</strong>iles <strong>of</strong> the State Security Department and Ministry <strong>of</strong><br />

People’s Security Appear to be Diverging<br />

Before Jang Song-taek’s removal from power and in the months following, the<br />

SSD and MPS remained in the public eye. The SSD was attached directly to Jang’s<br />

downfall. 550 Although Jang had ties to the KPISF, the MPS did not appear to suffer in<br />

terms <strong>of</strong> influence. 551 Kim Won-hong was a constant presence at Kim Jong-un’s public<br />

appearances and Choe Pu-il’s public persona did not significantly change.<br />

In April 2014 at the First Session <strong>of</strong> the 13th SPA, both Kim Won-hong and<br />

Choe Pu-il were reappointed as members <strong>of</strong> the NDC. 552 This move slightly altered<br />

549 “Kim Jong-un’s Order Number 0078 to Promote KPA Commanding Officer Ranks,” Nodong<br />

Sinmun, February 16, 2015.<br />

550 Lee Young-Jong and Ser Myo-Ja, “Ripples Still Felt From Jang Killing,” Korea JoongAng Daily,<br />

November 17, 2014. According to this source, Kim Won-hong’s status dramatically increased inside the<br />

circles <strong>of</strong> power in Pyongyang for his “effective” handling <strong>of</strong> Jang’s arrest, investigation, trial, and execution.<br />

551 Gang Byeong-Han, “Jang Song-thaek was Purged Because <strong>of</strong> Conflicts Surrounding Coal<br />

Mining Rights,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, December 24, 2013. According to this source, Choe Pu-il underwent<br />

investigation in the aftermath <strong>of</strong> Jang’s purge. However, it did not appear to impact his standing<br />

within the leadership.<br />

552 Kim Won-hong had initially been appointed to the NDC in 2012 and Choe Pu-il assumed<br />

the seat left vacant by Ri Myong-su in 2013.<br />

Ken E. Gause<br />

243

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