North Korean House of Cards

States targeted with vigorous sanctions, which led to a fundamental restructuring of
many of the entities tied to this network in the early 2000s. 408
A critical part of this apparatus was Office 99, which was responsible for
executing the Central Committee’s weapons acquisition and trade initiatives. 409
This office was established in 1981 at the direction of Kim Il-sung and placed
under Division 5 of the KWP MID. It was divided into at least four sub-bureaus:
production and planning, transportation, facilities, and commerce and banking.
Defector testimony suggests that it coordinated closely with the SEC to facilitate
exports. Indeed, Kim Min-su, who worked in Office 99, claimed that the bureau’s
leadership was also part of the SEC, at least through the early 1990s, when the top
officer in the bureau concurrently held the post of Deputy Chief of the SEC.
Office 99 also had strong ties to Kim Jong-il’s Personal Secretariat. His
daughter, Kim Sol-song, was reportedly a prominent figure in Office 99 in the
1980s and 1990s. 410 In addition, Office 38 was the parent organization of Office
99’s primary bank, the Changgwang Credit Bank. As weapons sales and acquisitions
became increasingly lucrative and important in the 1980s and 1990s, Kim Jong-il
authorized a channel of communication between Office 99 and Offices 38 and 39 in
order to tie this part of the defense-industrial complex to the Royal Economy.
On the sales side, Office 39 took the lead. In the hubs where it facilitated
its other activities, Office 39’s agents established offices dedicated to the front end
of defense sales. 411 According to sources in the region, one of the more active offices
operated out of Macau with responsibility for sales in Southeast Asia, the Middle
East, South Asia, and Africa. 412 Initial meetings were held between the agents and
potential buyers. Once a general agreement was reached, the agents would connect
the buyers to Pyongyang through an established channel that existed between Office
39 and Office 99. This would then lead to meetings in Pyongyang where potential
buyers would be allowed to view the merchandise and a final price would be agreed
on. Once the sale was completed, a portion of the proceeds would be channeled
408 Lee Beom-Jin, “Torpedo that Attacked Cheonan was Export Weapon of North Korea’s Green
Pine Association,” Weekly Chosun, 10-24 August 2010. In the 2007 to 2009 timeframe, the architecture
supporting weapons sales was changed due to the sanctions regime. The “Green Pine Association” was
created as a weapons export company to replace KOMID and was placed under the RGB in 2009. By
2010, it was handling over fifty percent of the total volume of North Korean weapons sales overseas. A
percentage of each sale was transferred from the RGB into Kim Jong-il’s “revolutionary fund.”
409 “Iran-DPRK Missile Cooperation, Role of Office No. 99” (Tokyo: Japan Policy Institute,
February 7, 2008).
410 Interview with senior North Korean defector, 2013 and 2014.
411 Interview with Pyongyang-watchers in South Korea and Japan who focus on North Korea’s
illicit networks.
412 Ibid.
Ken E. Gause
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