North Korean House of Cards

ally of the OGD against Jang, and the airing of the documentary of Ri’s book on
KCTV. 275 In 2014, five months after Jang’s downfall, Hwang Pyong-so, an OGD First
Vice Director, assumed control of the military’s most powerful agency, the GPB.
The argument that the Pyongyang-watching community must resolve in order
to understand the nature of the system is whether or not this elevation of the OGD’s
status has translated into decision-making power. Proponents of the theory that Kim
Jong-un is a puppet argue that the Suryong’s word was law under Kim Il-sung and
Kim Jong-il. It was enough to ensure that orders were executed and enforced. They
argue that Kim Jong-un does not command the same authority. Policy decisions are
ultimately made at enlarged Politburo meetings. Real power has transferred to the
OGD, which ensures policies are carried out. It is even suggested that an OGD “mafia”
may guide the decision-making process by lobbying its own agenda. 276
In all likelihood, the reality is much more complex. To suggest that Kim
Jong-un is a puppet ignores many of the tenets of the system that remain even if one
Supreme Leader has died and been replaced by a weaker heir. On the other hand, to
suggest that Kim Jong-un is able to assume the mantle of power that his father held,
to say nothing of his grandfather, sells short those aspects of legitimacy that the
Suryong must earn. This is a position that he must grow into.
While the absolute truth on leadership dynamics inside North Korea is
not possible to determine at this time, certain assumptions can be drawn from the
regime’s political culture and the public events surrounding Kim Jong-un. One
assumption is that Kim Jong-un is the ultimate decision-maker in a system that can
only function with one leader at the top from whom all legitimacy and power
flow. Along these lines, Kim Jong-un may have become the Control Tower with the
purge of Jang Song-taek. His personal apparatus of power must grow in order to allow
the Supreme Leader to fulfill this role. 277 Instead of being a puppet, Kim Jong-un
is an inexperienced leader who must take advantage of a leadership infrastructure
placed around him by his father to grow into his role as Supreme Leader. Once he has
achieved this, he will fully consolidate his power.
It can also be assumed that, following the purge of Jang Song-taek, the
wider leadership is frozen in place. 278 It is locked in step behind the Supreme
275 Park Hyeong-Jung, “The Purge of Jang Song-taek and the Competition for Regency During the
Power Succession,” Korea Institute for National Unification: Online Series 14, No. 3 (February 27, 2014).
276 “Kim Jong-un: North Korea’s Supreme Leader or State Puppet?” The Guardian, May 27, 2014.
This article provides a useful overview of the theories about how North Korea is ruled.
277 See the next chapter for an examination of Kim’s Personal Secretariat and apparatus of power.
278 The phrase “frozen in place” does not mean that the maneuvering and struggles for influence
have ceased within court politics around Kim Jong-un. Instead, it refers to the dose of caution that has
been injected into those dynamics. Individual leaders continue to promote themselves around the Su-
Ken E. Gause
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