North Korean House of Cards

c. The Aftermath of the Purge of Jang Song-taek
The purge and execution of Jang Song-taek on December 12, 2013 was not
just a simple matter of removing an individual from the leadership. It had profound
implications for the internal security apparatus. Structural changes and subsequent
purges to eliminate Jang’s protégés have been highlighted by regional media and have
given rise to theories about how the regime operates. The KWP OGD has gained its
share of notoriety as its cadre have become central to North Korea’s political narrative
in 2014. This has taken place within the context of an increasingly brutal crackdown
inside North Korea that has led some to speculate that the regime’s internal power
structures may be breaking down. Whether or not this is true, it raises questions about
the stability of the regime and the continued viability of the internal security apparatus.
i. Dismantling Jang’s Empire
In the days after Jang Song-taek’s execution, reports began to surface
about purges in the provinces throughout North Korea. The Pyongyang-watching
community initially assumed that these purges were tied solely to the eradication
of Jang Song-taek’s patronage system, but they were later found to fit within a fairly
coherent institutional narrative. In essence, it was a return to the state of affairs that
existed before Jang’s return from exile six years earlier.
Since 1990, when the KWP Administrative Department was merged into
the KWP OGD, the local Party organizational departments were in charge of the
public security institutions and had authority over personnel management. With
Jang Song-taek’s appointment as Director of the KWP Administrative Department
in 2007, however, administrative departments were established even in the lowest
counties to oversee local public security.
By 2013, only two of the more than thirty Central Committee departments
had sub-structures that reached the lowest levels of administration—the KWP
Administrative and Organization Guidance departments. The result of this development
was an evolving struggle for power and resources. The majority of cadres in
local Party administrative departments had personal connections to Jang Song-taek’s
network and expanded their authority in each region. In the process, the local Party
administrative departments constantly clashed with the organizational departments
that formed the core of the local Party.
Following Jang’s removal, Kim Jong-un took steps to rearrange the
organizational structure and lines of authority tied to the internal security apparatus
Ken E. Gause
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