North Korean House of Cards

a. Key Advisors
The purge of Jang Song-taek and the dissolution of the regent structure
have increased the political space around Kim Jong-un, which has been filled
by a handful of rising individuals. Best described as key advisors, these leaders
often accompany the Supreme Leader. In addition to their formal positions, they
most likely enjoy further influence by virtue of their proximity. This influence
sometimes manifests when they are ranked above their cohorts on recent funeral
committee lists, which Pyongyang-watchers use to identify the formal leadership
ranking within the regime. 199
Ironically, it is at this level where much of the turmoil within the leadership
ranks has occurred in 2015. In February, the international media claimed that
Pyon In-son, chief of the General Staff’s Operations Bureau was purged, allegedly
for disregarding or taking exception to Kim Jong-un’s orders.. 200, 201 This was not
confirmed in the North Korean press other than they were no longer highlighted as
being part of Kim Jong-un’s retinue during guidance inspections. In May 2015, the
NIS claimed that it had intelligence that Hyon Yong-chol, the Minister of People’s
199 The question many Pyongyang-watchers struggle with is whether any of these advisors impact
policy or doctrine development, or are they irrelevant to the policymaking process? In other words, do
they matter? In some cases, long-term advisors on critical policy areas, such as Kang Sok-ju, probably
play a role in providing context and critical advice. Others, especially power brokers in the military and
security apparatus, are less relevant to policymaking and, as such, more interchangeable in the balance of
power inside the regime.
200 Col. Gen. Pyon In-son (69) was director of the General Staff’s Operations Bureau. He was
part of the third generation of the military leadership. He was also a member of the KWP Central
Committee and deputy to the SPA. He was promoted to Colonel General on July 25, 2003.
Pyon’s career was spent moving between Pyongyang and the field commands. His early career
was primarily served in headquarters in the MPAF before he assumed the command of the Seventh Army
Corps in South Hamgyong Province in the late 1990s. In 2007, he returned to Pyongyang as a Vice
Minister of the People’s Armed Forces. Four years later, he was returned to the field as the Commander
of Fourth Army Corps in South Hwanghae Province. Following the March/April crisis, he returned to
the center as a Vice Minister of the People’s Armed Forces and Director of the General Staff Operations
Bureau (August 2013). He was ranked forty-third on the Jon Pyong-ho Funeral Committee list.
201 “Unidentified South Korean Government Official Says DPRK Kim Jong Un ‘Removed’ Two
Aides,” NHK, February 4, 2015. The media also speculated that Ma Won-chun, the Director of NDC
Design Department, had also been purged. Later speculation said that he had either been executed or
died before he could return to Pyongyang. In October 2015, Ma was identified as a member of Kim
Jong-un’s guidance inspection trip to Rason to examine how the North Korean city was recovering from
Typhoon Goni.
Ken E. Gause
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